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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, in a global world economy, we cannot discuss international
business transactions and trade without considering the various aspects of
letters of credit. Unlike in most domestic sales transactions, the seller and
buyer in a sale of goods in international commercial transactions have
various risks and questions concerning each other's national legal systems.
Because of the distance between a seller and buyer, the assistance of a third
party is necessary to ensure the concurrent exchange of goods for funds.'
A documentary sale that utilizes a letter of credit demonstrates how
possible risks can be allocated to third parties with special knowledge, who
assess each risk that is assumed, thereby reducing the possible risks of the
transaction.2
The main focus of this article is a recent case of the Supreme Court
of Korea, Supreme Court Case 96 DA 43713,3 concerning negotiating
banks and the fraud rule in letter-of-credit transactions. After an
introductory explanation of the main legal structure of letters of credit
transactions and the judicial decision-making process in Korea, this article
discusses the basic governing law and the legal principles of letter-of-credit
transactions relevant to the Supreme Court case. The article introduces the
specific factual basis and issues of the case. Then, it discusses the
reasoning of the Korean high court and the Supreme Court. This article
compares the instant case with U.S. case law and statutes.
The purpose of this article is to introduce a practical legal
interpretation of the Korean Supreme Court's position on fraud in letters
of credit and to compare this position with the fraud rule in the United
States. This article argues that the strong intention of the Korean Supreme
Court to protect the innocent party in letter-of-credit transactions is
prevailing over the general rule regarding letters of credit. It further states

1. See RALPH H. FOLSOM Er AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINESs TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL
140 (5th ed. 1996).
2. See id.
3. Paris Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. Hanil Bank, Inc., 96 Da 43713 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 1997) (Korea),
43 Pan-rye Kong-bo 2842 (Oct. 1, 1997) [hereinafter Supreme Court Case 96 Da 43713]. The
Second Division decision on the settlement of account for the payment of a sum relating to the
letters of credit. In Korea, there are several kinds of case reports published officially by the
Supreme Court Library, which is administered by the Supreme Court of Korea. Among them, Panrye Kong-bo [the Supreme Court case reporter], which is published biweekly and contains the full
text of important Supreme Court decisions, is the most popular. The full text of this instant case
was published in Pan-rye Kong-bo, No. 43, at 2842-51 (Oct. 1, 1997). This decision was written
in Korean and was translated into English by the author for this article. The abridged translation
of this Supreme Court decision is found in Appendix 1.
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that this position is a more obvious and clearer expression of the fraud rule
than that of common law countries.
II. LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. Overview
The internationally recognized definition of a letter of credit is as
follows:
[A]ny arrangement, however named or described, whereby a
bank (the "Issuing Bank"), acting at the request and on the
instructions of a customer (the "Applicant") or on its own
behalf,
(i) is to make a payment to or to the order of a third party
(the "Beneficiary"), or is to accept and pay bills of exchange
(Draft(s)) drawn by the Beneficiary,
or
(ii) authorises another bank to effect such payment, or to
accept and pay such bills of exchange...,
or
(iii) authorises another bank to negotiate, against
stipulated document(s), provided that the terms and conditions
of the Credit are complied with.'
By their very nature, letters of credit are separate and distinct
transactions from any underlying sales or contracts upon which they are
based.' Even if such contracts are mentioned in the letters of credit, banks
are not "concerned with or bound by" these underlying contracts.6
A letter-of-credit transaction in a sale of goods usually consists of
three contracts The contracts are as follows:
(1) The buyer and seller enter into a contract providing
for the purchase and sale of the goods.... This contract will
require payment through a documentary credit.

4. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS, I.C.C. Pub. No. 500, art. 2 [hereinafter U.C.P. 500].
5. See id. art. 3(a).
6. Id.; see also U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 5, §§ 5-103(d), 5-108(0(1) (1995) [hereinafter
U.C.C. ARTICLE 5].
7. See Paul H. Vishny, Letters of Credit: An Overview, in SB04 ALI-ABA 119, 123 (1996).
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(2) The buyer makes an application to its bank for a
letter of credit, instructing the bank to open [a letter of credit]
for the benefit of the seller on the terms specified in the
application. The second contract is between the buyer and its
bank. The bank customer is also referred to as the "account
party." The bank is the issuer.
(3) The issuing bank issues the letter of credit. Generally
the letter of credit is forwarded to an advising bank in the
country of the seller. The latter advises the seller of the
opening of the [letter of] credit in its favor. The letter of
credit is the third contract!
A second bank, if requested, additionally may confirm the letter of
credit.9 The confirmation is, in essence, a guarantee on the part of the
confirming bank that the credit will be paid if the bank's stipulations are
adhered to."° The confirmation of the letter of credit establishes a
contractual relationship, with its corresponding duties, between the issuing
and confirming
banks." The issuer is the customer of the confirming
2
bank.1
The standard letter of credit contains the following:
(1) The names of the parties, including the advising bank.
(2) The amount of the credit.
(3) A date of expiration, which is the last day on which
documents may be presented.
(4) The undertaking of the issuer to pay upon presentation of
the draft and specified documents. The [letter of] credit will
generally also provide for the tenor of the draft; that is,
whether it is payable on presentation (a sight draft) or payable
at some time after presentation (a time or usance draft).
(5) A description of the merchandise, and whether partial
shipments and transshipments are permitted.
(6) Special conditions or instructions. These will cover other
understandings between the parties such as requirements that
documents be sent to agents of the) purchaser, or that
presentation must be made within a certain time after issuance
of the shipping documents. 3

8. Id

9. See id
10.
11.
12.
13.

See id
Seeid. at124.
See id
Id. at 124-25.
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All letters of credit must select the bank (nominated bank) that is
authorized to pay (paying bank), or to accept drafts (accepting bank), or to
negotiate (negotiating bank), unless the letter of credit specifically allows
negotiation by any bank. 4 The nominated bank is often the issuing or
confirming bank."5 "The naming of another nominating bank (other than
the issuing or confirming bank) does not by itself impose any obligation on
the nominating bank to pay, accept, or negotiate."' 6 If the nominating bank
acts, the issuing bank will reimburse the nominating bank.'
B. Laws and Rules

The law and rules related to letter-of-credit transactions were
developed before World War I, mainly in England, and later by courts in
the United States.' 8 Internationally, letters of credit today are defined, and
tend to be governed by, the 1993 revision of the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits (U.C.P. 500), which was created by the
International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.) as a matter of custom and

contract. 9
Before U.C.P. 500, which went into effect January 1, 1994, the 1983
revision of the U.C.P. (U.C.P. 400)20 had, in general, been used in
international transactions.2 ' U.C.P. 500 contains many changes, one of
which is highlighted in this article.22 U.C.P. 500 is incorporated by
reference into most international letters of credit.23 U.C.P. 500 is a detailed
a
manual of operations for most banks, but its provisions are only 24
law.
be
to
purport
not
do
and
industry,
the
in
"custom"
the
of
restatement
The provisions are incorporated as an express statement of contract terms
and banking trade usage, and the [U.C.P.] contract terms furnish the rules
[that] usually determine the actions of the parties."2'

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id.at 127.
Seeid
Id
See id. at 127 (citing U.C.P. 500 art. 10(c)-(d)).
FOLSOMETAL., supra note 1, at 150.
See id.

20.

INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES FOR

I.C.C. Pub. No. 400 (1983) [hereinafter U.C.P. 400].
21. Michael Evans Avidon, Counsel's Corner, Leaers ofCredit-New UCP 500 to Take Effect
January 1, 1994, 111 BANKING L.J. 83 (1994).
22. See id.at 83-87 (describing the details of difference).
23. See FOLSOMETAL., supra note 1,at 150.
24. See id.
25. Id.
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS,
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In the United States, letters of credit also are under the regulation of
the 1995 revision of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),
as a matter of statutory law. 26 But, most of Article 5 is not mandatory law,

and consequently, most of its provisions defer to the specific contract terms
of the parties as stated in the contract. 2" In New York, Alabama, Arizona,
and Missouri, a nonuniform amendment in section 5-102(4) states that if
the U.C.P. is written into a letter of credit, it alone governs. 2 It would
appear that this provision would make letters of credit containing it subject
to case law, but sometimes courts in the United States have either ignored
it or used Article 5 by analogy, as necessary.29

Generally, the U.C.P. provisions have a greater effect on the analysis
of nonfraud issues, while U.C.C. Article 5 provisions are relevant to issues
concerning allegations offraud." Therefore, the fraud provisions of Article
5 are important to the analysis and discussion of Supreme Court Case 96
Da 43 713.
1. The Doctrine of Independence
The main frame of letter-of-credit transactions and the main principle
of credit law is that a letter of credit is independent of any underlying
contract.3 U.C.P. 500 and U.C.C. Revised Article 5 clearly indicate that
"modem letters of credit benefit from this principle by stating that the letter
of credit is an independent engagement to be construed and performed in
accordance with its own terms, without reference to any other agreement
or transaction. ' 2 The Revised Article 5 explicitly states that letter-ofcredit obligations are distinct from and independent of the underlying
transactions.33 This was a fundamental predicate for the original Article 5
even though it was unexpressed. 3' Certainty of payment, independent of
other claims, setoffs, or other causes of action, are core elements of the
commercial utility of letters of credit."
26. See id.
27. See id
28. See id.
29. See id
30. See id at 151.
31. See Katherine A. Barski, Comment, Letters of Credit:A Comparison ofArticle 5 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Customs and Practicefor Documentary Credits, 41
LOYOLA L. REV. 735, 740 (1996).
32. Id (citing U.C.C. § 5-103; U.C.P. 500 arts. 3, 4, 14-15).
33. See U.C.C. §§ 5-103(d), 5-108(0); Barski, supra note 31, at 740.
34. See Barski, supra note 31, at 740 (citing U.C.C. art. 5, § 5-101(AXI) (Benefits of Revised
Article 5 in General, Independence Principle)).
35. See U.C.C. art. 5, § 5-101(aXI) (prefatory note).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/2
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U.C.C. Article 5 Section 5-103(d) provides as follows:
Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary or a
nominated person under a letter of credit are independent of
the existence, performance, or nonperformance of a contract
or arrangement out of which the letter of credit arises or which
underlies it, including contracts or arrangements between the
issuer and the applicant and between the applicant and the
beneficiary.36
Section 5-108(f) provides that "[a]n issuer is not responsible for: (1) the
performance or nonperformance of the underlying contract, arrangement,
or transaction, (2) an act or omission of others, or (3) observance or
knowledge of the usage of a particular trade other than the standard practice
referred to in subsection (e)." 3
U.C.P. 500 puts an equal emphasis on the independence of letter-ofcredit obligations. 3' Article 3 provides as follows:
Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from
the sales or other contract(s) on which they may be based and
banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such
contract(s), even if any reference whatsoever to such
contract(s) is included in the Credit. Consequently, the
undertaking of a bank to pay, accept and pay Draft(s) or
negotiate and/or to fulfil any other obligation under the Credit,
is not subject to claims or defences by the Applicant resulting
from his relationships with the Issuing Bank or the
Beneficiary.
...A Beneficiary can in no case avail himself of the
contractual relationships existing between the banks or
between the Applicant and the Issuing Bank.39
This new Article 3 notes, in particular, that the rights and duties of the
parties involved are independent of each other and clearly states that
neither the beneficiary nor the applicant can utilize any underlying
contractual relationship.'

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.art. 5, § 5-103(d).
Id. § 5-108(f).
See Barski, supra note 31, at 740.
U.C.P. 500 art. 3(a)-(b).
See Barski, supra note 31, at 740.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

7

Florida Journal ofFLORIDA
International
Vol. 12, Iss. 1LAW
[1998], Art. 2
JOURNALLaw,
OF INTERNATIONAL

[Vol. 12

Even though this doctrine is clearly stated in U.C.C. Article 5 and
U.C.P. 500, case law has developed an exception to the doctrine - the
fraud rule.4 ' The fraud exception states that a court may, by injunction,
keep a bank from honoring drafts in the case of fraud.42 This position is set
forth in the current U.C.C. Article 5.43 However, the courts have been
inconsistent in their treatment of the fraud exception, with some limiting
it to instances that vitiate the "entire transaction" or are considered
"egregious."
Additionally, some courts require the presence of
"decepti[ve]," dishonorable, or "unscrupulous" actions, while others use
a more flexible criteria.45
2. U.C.P. 500: International
U.C.P. 500 is applicable to all letters of credit that "incorporate" it
into their text. 46 This is a remarkable shift from Article 1 of U.C.P. 400,
which stated that unless expressly stated otherwise, U.C.P. 400 applied to
all documentary credits. 4 Therefore, the question remains concerning the
effect of U.C.P. 500 when the parties do not expressly agree otherwise in
documentary letter-of-credit transactions.
U.C.P. 400 had given banks "a reasonable time" to examine the
documents and decide whether to take up or refuse the documents.48 If a
bank decided to refuse the documents, the issuing bank had to immediately
give notice of such.49 U.C.P. 500 changed the length of time allowed for
examining documents and giving notice of discrepancies." U.C.P. 500
Article 13(b) is more explicit and provides as follows:
The Issuing Bank, the Confirming Bank, if any, or a
Nominated Bank acting on their behalf, shall each have a
reasonable time, not to exceed seven banking days following
the day of receipt of the documents, to examine the documents
and determine whether to take up or refuse the documents and

41. See Vishny, supra note 7, at 128.
42. See id.The fraud exception developed from the leading case, Sztejn v. JHenrySchroder
Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S. 2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
43. See Vishny, supra note 7, at 128 (citing U.C.C. art. 5, § 5-109).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Avidon, supra note 21, at 83; U.C.P. 500 art. 1.
47. Avidon, supra note 21, at 83.
48. See U.C.P. 400 art. 16(c); Avidon, supra note 21, at 83.
49. U.C.P. 400 art. 16(d); Avidon, supra note 21, at 84.
50. See Avidon, supra note 21, at 83.
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to inform the party from which it received the documents
accordingly. 5
However, different time periods can be written into the letters of
credit.52 For example, commercial transactions might require large
amounts of documentation, which would require more time for review. 3
On the other hand, standby letters of credit, which require relatively little
documentation,
could be reviewed in a shorter time period.54
Under Article
13(a) determination of the compliance of documents
with the terms and conditions of a letter of credit will be made by
55
"'international standard banking practice as reflected in these Articles.'
There was no such provision in U.C.P. 400.56 Article 2 provides that if
branches of a bank are located in different countries, they are to be
considered as different banks.5 Branches of a bank located in the same
country presumably are to be considered as part of a single bank.58
The exact meaning of "negotiate" under a negotiation credit was not
defined in U.C.P. 400, nor is it currently clearly defined.59 Presently,
U.C.P. 500 Article 10(b)(ii) defines "negotiation" as "the giving of value
for Draft(s) and/or document(s) by the bank authorised to negotiate. Mere
examination of the documents without giving of value does not constitute
a negotiation."'
Under this definition giving value "without recourse" is not expressly
required. 6' The I.C.C. Commission on Banking Technique and Practice
took the position that the regulations described in the provisions of U.C.P.62
500 were interpreted inaccurately as altering the traditional practice itself.
The I.C.C. said that U.C.P. 500 was only a codification of traditional
customs that had been continued. 63 They also provided the following
explanation of Article 10(b)(ii):
51. U.C.P. 500 art. 13(b).
52. Avidon, supra note 21, at 84.

53. See id.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See id.
Id. at 85 (quoting U.C.P. 500 art. 13(a)).
See id
See id. at 87.
See id.
Id.
U.C.P. 500 art. 10(bXii).
Avidon, supra note 21, at 87.

62. COMMISSION ON BANKING TECHNIQUE AND PRACTICE, ICC POSITION PAPER, F10-06,
UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS,

Foreword at 6/9 (1994)

[hereinafter ICC POSITION PAPER].

63. See id. Position paper No.2, at 7/9.
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[T]he phrase "giving of value"... may be interpreted as either
making immediate payment (e.g. by cash, by cheque, by
remittance through a Clearing System or by credit to an
account) or "undertaking an obligation to make payment"
(other than giving a deferred payment undertaking or
accepting a draft)."
3. U.C.C. Article 5: The United States
Section 5-103 of Article 5 of the U.C.C. defines its scope, which
includes almost all letter-of-credit transactions used in a commercial
context.65 However, the provision also expressly states that "the effect of
[the] article may be varied by agreement or by a provision stated or
incorporated by reference in an undertaking."
Section 5-102(1) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned." 7 This definition reinforces the
independence principle used in treating the fraud and strict compliance
tests, which affect the obligations in letter-of-credit transactions.68 The
honesty in fact definition does not include "fair dealing," and is
"appropriate to the decision to honor or dishonor a presentation of
documents specified in a letter of credit." 9 This narrower definition also
is suitable if greater certainty about obligations is needed, in addition to
being consistent with the goals of speed and low cost.7°
Article 5 does not govern contracts between applicants and
beneficiaries, which are covered under contract law such as U.C.C. Article
2 or the general law of contracts.7 1 In such a contract, "good faith" is
defined by other laws, like section 2-103(1)(b) or Restatement of Contracts
2d, "which incorporate the principle of 'fair dealing' in most cases,
or... common law, or other statutory provisions that may apply to the
contract. 72 Article 5, and in part other law, govern contracts between

64. Id.

65. See U.C.C. art. 5, § 5-103(a) (providing that it "applies to letters of credit and to certain
rights and obligations arising out of transactions involving letters of credit").
66. U.C.C. § 5-103(c)); see Barski, supra note 31, at 738.
67. U.C.C. § 5-102(1).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

U.C.C. § 5-102(1), cmt. 3.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/2
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applicants and issuers." The definition ofgood faith in section 5-102(a)(7)
is applicable "only to the extent that the reimbursement contract is
governed by provisions in this article, for other purposes good faith is
defined by other law."'74
Article 5 section 5-108 provides as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 5-109, an
issuer shall honor a presentation that, as determined by the
standard practice referred to in subsection (e), appears on its
face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the
letter of credit. Except as otherwise provided in Section 5113 and unless otherwise agreed with the applicant, an issuer
shall dishonor a presentation that does not appear so to
comply.
(b) An issuer has a reasonable time after presentation,
but not beyond the end of the seventh business day of the
issuer after the day of its receipt of documents:
(1) to honor,
(2) if the letter of credit provides for honor to be
completed more than seven business days after presentation,
to accept a draft or incur a deferred obligation, or
(3) to give notice to the presenter of discrepancies in the
presentation.
(e) An issuer shall observe standard practice of financial
institutions that regularly issue letters of credit.
Determination of the issuer's observance of the standard
practice is a matter of interpretation for the court. The court
shall offer the parties a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence of the standard practice."
A letter of credit often authorizes presentation by the beneficiary to
someone other than the issuing bank. 6 This bank might be identified as a
"paying bank," an "accepting bank," or a "negotiating bank," while
sometimes other cases there is no specific designation." No duties are
imposed by section 5-108 on any person except for the issuer or
confirmor.7" A nominated person or other person might be liable under

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id.
Id.
Id.§ 5-108(a),(b),(e).
See id § 5-108, cmt. 6.
See id.
See id.
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Article 5 or common law if he or she does not honor an express or implied
agreement with the beneficiary."
The standard practice mentioned in section 5-108(e) includes
international practice set forth in or referenced by the U.C.P., other practice
rules published by associations of financial institutions, and local and
regional practice."0 The standard practice might differ in different places."'
The parties to the letter of credit must indicate the practice that will govern
their rights if conflicting practices are present.8 2 A practice may be
overridden by agreement or course of dealing. 3
Section 5-109, dealing with fraud and forgery, provides as follows:
(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face
strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter
of credit, but a required document is forged or materially
fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would facilitate a
material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant:
(1) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if honor is
demanded by (i) a nominated person who has given value in
good faith and without notice of forgery or material fraud, (ii)
a confirmor who has honored its confirmation in good faith,
(iii) a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of
credit which was taken after acceptance by the issuer or
nominated person, or (iv) an assignee of the issuer's or
nominated person's deferred obligation that was taken for
value and without notice of forgery or material fraud after the
obligation was incurred by the issuer or nominated person;
and
(2) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honor or
dishonor the presentation in any other case.
(b) If an applicant claims that a required document is
forged or materially fraudulent or that honor of the
presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the
beneficiary on the issuer or applicant, a court of competent
jurisdiction may temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer
from honoring a presentation or grant similar relief against the
issuer or other persons only if the court finds that:

79. See id.
80. Id. § 5-108, cmt. 8.
81. See id.
82. See id.

83. See id.
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(1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable
to an accepted draft or deferred obligation incurred by the
issuer;
(2) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may
be adversely affected is adequately protected against loss that
it may suffer because the relief is granted;
(3) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief
under the law of this State have been met; and
(4) on the basis ofthe information submitted to the court,
the applicant is more likely than not to succeed under its claim
of forgery or material fraud and the person demanding honor
4
does not qualify for protection under subsection (a)(1).
Fraud either must be found in the documents or have been committed
by the beneficiary against the issuer or applicant.85 In addition, it explicitly
states that fraud must be "'material.' "86 Thus, "the breadth and width of
'materiality"' must be determined by the courts.8 7 The fraudulent aspect
of a document must be material to the purchaser, or the fraudulent act must
be of moment to the participants in the underlying transaction."
If there is an allegation of material fraud, the courts must examine the
underlying transaction.89 "Only by examining that transaction can one
determine whether a document is fraudulent or the beneficiary has
committed fraud, and if so, whether the fraud was material." Only if the
beneficiary has "no colorable right to expect honor" and no basis exists for
supporting such a right to honor, can the beneficiary be considered to have
committed material fraud.9
According to sections 105-109(a)(2), the issuer may honor the letter
of credit despite the applicant's claim of fraud.92 "[T]he issuer may
dishonor and defend that dishonor by showing fraud or forgery of the kind
stated in subsection (a)."93 It would appear that most issuers would honor
the letter of credit regardless of an applicant's claims of fraud or forgery
unless the applicant procures an injunction, since they would be liable for

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.§ 5-109.
See id. § 5-109, cmt. 1.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.

90. Id
91. Id.

92. See id § 5-109, cmt. 2.
93. Id.This provision had not been stated in the former section 5-114. See id
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wrongful dishonor if they are unable to prove forgery or material fraud.94
Even though the issuer may have a right to dishonor and to defend that
dishonor, it cannot be concluded that the issuer has a duty to the applicant
to dishonor.95 Under normal circumstances, an applicant would get an
injunction. 6 However, this is not possible if "the applicant will have a
claim against the issuer only in the rare case in which [the applicant] can
show that the issuer did not honor in good faith. 97
The standard for injunctive relief is high, with the burden lying with
the applicant to demonstrate by evidence and not mere allegation that relief
is warranted.9" Some courts have enjoined payments on letters of credit
based on an insufficient showing by the applicant. 99 Certain third parties
are protected against the risk of fraud by section 5-109(a)(1)."
By issuing a letter of credit that nominates a person to
negotiate or pay, the issuer.., induces that nominated person
to give value and thereby assumes the risk that a draft drawn
under the letter of credit will be transferred to one with a
status equal to that of a holder in due course who deserves to
be protected against a fraud defense.'"'
U.C.P. 500 does not contain a fraud provision,"°2 indicating that the
drafters intent "was to defer to local law on this issue."'0 3 Since the laws
of the various jurisdictions that adopt the U.C.P. are not uniform, this was
an intelligent choice on their part." Deferring to local law also provides
an incentive for the various jurisdictions "to fashion fraud rules that do not
interfere with the marketability of credits issued by the jurisdictions'
banks.' 05

94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id
97. Id.
98. See id. § 5-109 cmt. 4.
99. See id. In Griffin Cos.v. FirstNat 'lBank 374N.W.2d 768 (Minn. App. 1985), the court
enjoined payment under a standby letter of credit, basing its decision on plaintiff's allegation, rather
than competent evidence, of fraud. See U.C.C. art. 5, § 109, cmt. 4.
100. See idl § 5-109 cmt. 6.

101. Id.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Barski, supranote 31, at 751.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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III. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF KOREA

The modem independent judicial system in Korea, which was
introduced in 1894, was disrupted by the invasion of the Japanese
imperialists."°6 During the Japanese colonial period, Korea adopted the
Japanese legal system, which had come from the modem European civil
law countries." 7 The adoption of the Japanese legal system created the
necessary momentum for Korea's eventual assimilation of the modem
European civil law system.'
There are three tiers of courts in Korea: the district courts (including
the specialized Family Court and Administrative Court), which are the
courts of original jurisdiction; the high courts, which are the intermediate
appellate courts; and the Supreme Court, which is the highest court in
Korea."° The high courts and the district courts are divided into
geographic districts. "0 Following the civil law tradition, no court is bound
by the views of another court as a matter of law. "'l Thus, a decision of the
Supreme Court does not have the binding force of precedent in subsequent
cases of a similar nature, but merely has a persuasive effect.1 2 However,
there are certain de jure and de facto exceptions to this principle." 3 For
example, the interpretation of a law rendered in a particular case by the
Supreme Court has a binding effect on the lower courts when the case is
remanded." 4 Also, the opinions of the higher courts in previous cases especially those of the Supreme Court - generally exert a significant de
facto influence upon subsequent court decisions."'
The status of Korean law, particularly in civil and commercial
matters, is determined by available case law." 6 If Korean law on a point

106.

See MINISTRY OF COURT ADMINISTRATION OF THE SUPREME COURT, JUDICIAL SYSTEM

OF KOREA 12 (1996) [hereinafter JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF KOREA]. More information about the
judicial system of Korea, i.e., court system, judicial actors, and procedures, can be found at the
official website of the Supreme Court of Korea at <http://www.scourt.go.kr>.
107. See JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF KOREA, supra note 106, at 12.
108. See id.
109. See id at 15-19; see also The Court Organization Act, Law No. 3992 of 1987 (Korea)
(amended by Law No. 5181 of 1996) [hereinafter Court Organization Act] (aiming to prescribe the
organization of courts exercising the judicial power under the Constitution has specific provisions

on the courts system in Korea).
See JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF KOREA, supra note 106, at 15, 21.
See id. at 16.
See id.
See id. at 29.
114. See id.; see also Court Organization Act art 8.
115. See JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF KOREA, supra note 106, at 29.
116. See Sang-Hyun Song, SpecialProblems in Studying KoreanLaw, in KOREANLAW INTHE
110.
111.
112.
113.
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is not well-developed or is vague, Korean courts will examine foreign
cases. 1 7 Consequently, when arguing for a particular result or
interpretation, it is worth while to cite foreign case law."'
The doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable in Korea as a matter of
theory; however, in practice, precedent has a strong influence on Korean9
courts, particularly with regard to decisions of the Supreme Court."
"Laws and regulations formulated in general and abstract terms only
correspond to the reality of social life through their application by judges
to specific cases."' 20 In addition, courts tend to follow previous
interpretations of a law when deciding similar cases.' 2 ' Knowledge of only
the rules as formulated in the legislative texts is an imprecise knowledge
of Korean law, at best. 22 Judges through their interpretation can indirectly
change the meaning of legal texts and even make new rules if there is no
guidance from existing legislation.'23 Therefore, "[t]he binding force of
legislation is thus more theoretical than real for a judge." 2 4
Precedent is the main consideration of judges; they must follow the
decisions of previous cases that are well established, especially Supreme
Court decisions. 25 Ajudge's interpretation, "however faithful to the exact
words of the law, would undoubtedly be reversed on appeal if it were not
in conformity with Supreme Court decisions.... In these circumstances
a theory has developed which recognizes case law as having the character
of a formal source of law."' 126 Once the opinion of the Supreme Court on
the specific legal issue is established, the procedure for changing this
opinion is very complicated and difficult.
The Court Organization Act of 1987 states that "[tihe jurisdiction of
the [Korean] Supreme Court shall be exercised by the collegiate body
composed of more than two-thirds of all the Justices of the Supreme Court
with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presiding, [p]rovided a case

GLOBAL ECONOMY 189 (Sang-Hyun Song ed., 1996) (Korea).
117. See id

118. See id.
119. See id. at 190.

120. Id.
121.

See id

122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id at 190-91.
125. See id. at 191.

126. Id. The importance of a case is determined by which branch of law covers the case. See
id. Private law cases have held an important position for a long time, within civil law and
commercial law. See id.
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[has been] examined in advance by a Division."' 2 A division consists of
three or more Justices of the Supreme Court, and only if the Justices agree
will a case be tried. 2 ' However, a division cannot hear the case if there are
conflicts between the opinions of the Justices or if"it is deemed necessary
to modify the opinion on the application of the interpretation of the
Constitution, laws, orders or regulations, which was formerly decided by
' ' 29 The case must
the
Supreme
Court.the
Justices,
including
Chief Justice. 3 ' be decided by the whole body of
IV. SUPREME COURT CASE 96 DA 43 713

A. Overview
The instant case, Supreme Court Case 96 Da 43 713, was decided on
August 29, 1997 by the second division of the Supreme Court, and
concerned the Paris National Bank, Inc., plaintiff, and the Hanil Bank, Inc.,
defendant. 3 ' The Court reversed the original decision" and remanded the
case to the Seoul High Court.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court used the definition of "giving
of value" as stated in U.C.P. 500 in order to solve the problem between the
parties, who agreed that their contracts had been under the control of

127. Court Organization Act, art. 7, § 1. The legal basis for Divisions in the Supreme Court
is article 102, section I of the CONSTITUTION OF KoREA. Now, there are four divisions in the
Supreme Court.
128. See Court Organization Act, art. 7, § 1, at provisory clause.
129. Id. art. 7, § 1(3).
130. Article 7, section 1 of the Court Organization Act also contains the necessity of the whole
body decision in those following cases: where it is deemed that any order or regulation is in
contravention of the Constitution; where it is deemed that any order or regulation is contrary to law;
and where it is deemed that a trial by Divisions is not proper by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. See id. art. 7, § 1.
131. Supreme CourtCase 96Da 43713,43 Pan-rye Kong-bo at 2842. The four Justices of the
Supreme Court - Hyung-Sun Kim, Man-Ho Park, Jun-Suh Park, and Yong-Hoon Lee participated in this unanimous decision, and the Court opinion was delivered by Justice Man-Ho
Park.
132. The original decision was made by the Seoul High Court on August 28, 1996. ParisNat'l
Bank, Inc. v. Hanil Bank, Inc., 94NA 18043 (Seoul High Ct. Aug. 28, 1996) (Korea) (unpublished)
[hereinafter Seoul High Court Case 94 NA 18043]. This decision is not yet published officially.
However, I obtained a photocopy of the official copy of this original decision from another judge
in Korea and translated the important part of this decision into English for this article. The above
mentioned photocopy of the Seoul High Court Case 94 NA 18043 will be used as an authority for
this case and be expressed it as "the official copy of the decision."
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The Supreme Court interpreted "giving of value" as
U.C.P. 400.'
meaning either making immediate payments or undertaking an obligation
to make payment. The Court determined that negotiation of documents
through the latter method means the negotiating bank can replace the
immediate payment of actual value by undertaking an absolute obligation
without any stipulations to the beneficiary concerning
for definite payment
34
date.
a particular
Through this interpretation, the plaintiff bank and the negotiating
bank were presumed to have known or have had sufficient reason to know
of the fraud. The Supreme Court decided that where shipping documents
are forged, if a bank was involved in the forgery, or knew about the
forgery, or where there is reasonable suspicion for such an act, the bank
cannot be protected from the principle of independence and abstraction of
the letters of credit. 135
Korea has no specific or general statutes concerning letter-of-credit
transactions. In addition, there had been no specific Supreme Court case
on the fraud issue in letter-of-credit transactions and the duties of banks in
such transactions prior to the instant case. Therefore, as evidenced by the
instant case, where there are no related domestic statutes, the opinion of the
Supreme Court in a similar previous case has a strong effect on the
judgments of lower courts.
B. FactualBasis
According to the original judgment decided by the Seoul High Court
background facts of Supreme
and the decision of the Supreme Court, the
136
follows.
as
are
43713
Da
96
Court Case

133. The main points of this case are summarized in the Supreme Court Case 96 Da 43713,
43 Pan-rye Kong-bo at 2842-45.
134. See id. at 2842.
135. See id.
136. Generally, the finding of facts in a specific case is an exclusive power of the high court.
So, the grounds for appeal to the Supreme Court are limited. In civil cases, they are limited to the
constitutional and legal questions material to the appealed judgments. The six specific grounds for
appeal are provided in the Article 394 § I of the Code ofCivil Procedure (Korea). They are as
follows:
(1) In cases where the court to render judgment has not been constituted in
compliance with law;
(2) In cases where ajudge who was precluded by virtue of law from participating
in the judgment, has participated therein;
(3) In cases where provisions relating to exclusive jurisdiction have been
contravened;
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1. General Transaction
The Seoul branch of the Paris National Bank (Seoul branch) received
applications for the issuance of five irrevocable master letters of credit
from the Shin Han International Corporation (Shin Han) in September and
October of 1991.137 The Seoul branch then issued the letters of credit under
U.C.P. 400. The Hanil Bank, Inc. confirmed the above mentioned five
letters of credit and signed the contractual form between Shin Han and the
Seoul branch as a guarantor of the letter of credit contracts for Shin Han.
The beneficiary of the five master letters of credit was Newroots, Ltd., a
subsidiary of Shin Han. The negotiating bank and the advising bank in
these transactions were restricted to the Hong Kong branch of the Paris
National Bank (Hong Kong branch). As the advising bank, the Hong Kong
branch notified Newroots of the opening of the letters of credit. After
offering the documents of the master letters of credit as collateral,
Newroots applied to the Hong Kong branch for the issuing of back-to-back
letters of credit, the amounts of which were approximately the same as the
master letters of credit. The Hong Kong branch then issued these back-toback letters of credit'38 for Charles International Ltd., the beneficiary.
Charles International requested negotiation of these back-to-back
letters of credit from the French American Banking Co. located in New
York. The French American Banking Co. paid for the letters of credit and
requested reimbursement of the transactions from the Hong Kong branch.
The Hong Kong branch reimbursed the French American Banking Co. for
the transaction and then received the documents. The Hong Kong branch
did not receive any reimbursement for these transactions from Newroots,

(4) In cases where there was a defect in the powers of the legal representative or
attorney or in the special authority of an attorney for doing proceeding acts;
(5) In cases where provisions regarding open pleading have been violated; and
(6) In cases where a judgment has not been furnished with reasons or there exist

inconsistency in the reasoning.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Korea), ch. 2, art. 394. However, the Supreme Court sometimes
interferes with this fact finding power of lower courts when the legal rules of evidence are violated.
The ground for appeal would be the above-mentioned subsection 6.
137. The facts regarding basic transaction of this case were in Seoul High Court Case 94 Na
18043, translatedin the official copy of the decision. This article summarized these facts. For
easier understanding of this instant case, refer to Appendix 2.
138. For an understanding of back-to-back letters of credit, see FOLSOMETAL., supra note 1,
at 179-83. Brokers of goods may sell the goods to a buyer in one transaction and then buy them
from a supplier- another seller in a separate transaction. This back-to-back letter of credit allows
a broker to finance its purchase of goods.
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rather it treated the reimbursement as a loan to Newroots, with the
documents serving as collateral. This kind of transaction is generally
called an advance on documents. The Hong Kong branch, which had
received authorization to negotiate each master letter of credit, received the
drafts and the documents of each in good faith. The Hong Kong branch did
so in order to clear funds for these back-to-back letters of credit to be used
as collateral for the loan to the beneficiary, Newroots.
On the January 8, 1992, upon hearing the rumor that Shin Han, the
applicant who had requested the issuance of the master letters of credit,
was bankrupt, the Hong Kong branch immediately decided to negotiate the
master letters of credit in order to get the loan principal back. At
approximately 7:00 p.m. of the same day, through telex communication,
the Hong Kong branch expressed its intention to negotiate of the letters of
credit and made it clear that it would take the obligation of Newroots for
the payment of negotiation to the Seoul branch, the plaintiff who had
issued the master letters of credit. However, the Hong Kong branch did not
pay the total value of the letters of credit into the account of Newroots.
The Hong Kong branch made a deposit to the account ofNewroots only for
the payment of the document in agreement with the negotiation application
that was written by Newroots between 1:55 p.m. and 2:24 p.m. on January
9.139

2. The Fraud
Hanil Bank, which had guaranteed the letters of credit, received a
request for the reimbursement of the letters of credit from the Hong Kong
branch. Wan-Yel Lee and Min-Chul Lee, staff members of bank were
charged with investigating the associated shipping documents, and
discovered that the air freight shipping papers were forged. On January 9,
they visited the Seoul branch at about 10:00 a.m. (based on Korean time,
Hong Kong time is one hour behind). They apprised Man-Soo Lee, the
manager of the Seoul branch, and Sae-Chul Kim, the director of the
situation. They explained that they had contacted the company that had
issued the papers and confirmed that the papers were indeed forged. WanYeal Lee and Min-Chul Lee further explained that they had informed of the
forgery of airfreight shipping papers relating to the letters of credit as well.
The director of the Seoul branch verified this with the Hong Kong branch,
but the negotiation of the letters of credit had already been completed.

139. This exact time is taken from Supreme Court Case 96 Da 43713, 43 Pan-rye Kong-bo
at 2848.
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Later in the afternoon, Wan-Yel Lee of the Hanil Bank confirmed this in
writing to the Seoul branch.
In the meantime, Korea Commercial Bank, Inc. discovered forged
airfreight shipping papers associated with another letter of credit that it had
issued. The bank notified the Hong Kong branch at 10:40 a.m. of the same
day that these airfreight shipping papers were forged and informed the
Hong Kong branch that the associated letter of credit was void.
In the instant case, the Hong Kong branch deposited the sum for the
negotiation of the instate letters of credit, as specified by Newroots,
between 1:55 p.m. and 2:24 p.m. on the same day. The manager of the
Hong Kong branch of the Hanil Bank, the defendant, also visited the
plaintiff bank's Hong Kong branch at 4:00 p.m. on the same day to inform
them of the forgery and then requested a stop payment on the documents.
The Hong Kong branch sent the shipping documents for the letters of
credit to the issuing bank, the Seoul branch, at 6:03 p.m. on the same day.
On January 10 and January 11, the savings account of Newroots was
closed. The Hong Kong branch appropriated the funds from the closed
account in order to reimburse the loaned money needed to settle the
account of the back-to-back letters of credit, and deposited the remainder
of the balance into a different Newroots account. The Seoul branch
received the necessary documents relating to the letters of credit from the
Hong Kong branch, confirmed the consistency of these documents, and
then reimbursed the sum for negotiation on January 10.
C. The Issues
In this case, in order to decide whether the negotiation of the
documents was made in good faith by the negotiating bank, the Court had
to decide exactly when the negotiation of the documents had been made by
the Hong Kong branch. If the Hong Kong branch knew about the forgery
of the shipping documents at the time of negotiation, it would be hard to
claim that the negotiating bank should be protected from the fraud.
In 1991, when the basic letter of credit contracts under consideration
in Supreme Court Case 96 Da 43713 were issued, U.C.P. 500 was not
available to the parties. The applicant, the plaintiff bank, and the defendant
bank agreed that their letter-of-credit transaction would be regulated by
U.C.P. 400. As mentioned previously, there was no provision in U.C.P.
400 regarding the definition of "negotiation." U.C.P. 500, however, does
have a provision on this point. Therefore, a major question that arises in
this 1997 case is whether without any agreements by the parties, the U.C.P.

500 provisions would be applicable to letter-of-credit transactions entered

into during the effective period of U.C.P. 400. This question is very

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

21

JOURNALLaw,
OF INTERNA77ONAL
Florida Journal of FLORIDA
International
Vol. 12, Iss. 1LAW[
[1998], Art. 2

[Vol. 12

closely related to the nature of U.C.P. 500 and the question of whether
U.C.P. 500 can be used as a source of law in international business
transactions.
According to the Civil Code of Korea, which is the source of law in
Korea: "Ifthere is no provision in law applicable to certain civil affairs,
the customary law shall apply to them, and if there is no customary law
applicable to them, sound reasoning shall apply to them.""' This provision
is generally accepted as one of the basic principles of law in Korea.
Though U.C.P. 400 had no specific provision about the definition of
"negotiation," U.C.P. 500 Article 10(b)(ii) defines "negotiation" as "the
giving of value for Draft(s) and/or document(s) by the bank authorised to
negotiate, [where m]ere examination of the documents without giving of
value does not constitute a negotiation.,' 4' Therefore, a question arises
about the definition of "negotiation" under U.C.P. 400, and as to how the
definition would have been interpreted in the instant case under U.C.P.
500. Whether the negotiating bank in the instant case was in accordance
with the principle of faithfulness at the time of negotiation might depend
on the interpretation of "negotiation." With regard to the opinion of the
I.C.C. Commission, this article gives special attention to the interpretation
of the Korean Supreme Court.
Generally, in common law countries, fraud problems in commercial
transactions are solved through the fraud rule that was established by
courts. In Korea, a civil law country, even though there has been a general
provision in the Korean Civil Code concerning fraud transactions, the
specific application of that provision is under the authority of the courts.
In accordance with the general spirit of Korean civil law, Article 2
(Good Faith Principle) of the Korean Civil Code provides that "[t]he
exercise of rights and performance of duties shall be in good faith and in
accordance with the principles of trust[, and] [n]o abuse of right shall be
permitted."'" By application of this provision, the courts in Korea have
decided many cases concerning fraud problems. Therefore, the application
of this provision in Korea is very similar to the fraud rule in common law,
and the interpretation of this provision in a specific transaction has very
important meaning to other similar cases.
In the instant case, the Court had to create a reasonable standard on
which to decide whether a bank was involved in a fraudulent transaction,
and whether the bank knew of the fraud. The Court also had to define the
obligation of that bank in that situation. This article focuses on the attitude
140. THE CIVIL CODE (Korea) art. I (Source of Law) [hereinafter KOREAN CIVIL CODE].
141. U.C.P. 500 art. 10(b)(ii).
142. KOREAN CIVIL CODE, art. 2.
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of the Supreme Court towards fraud in letter-of-credit transactions.

Therefore, in the instant case, questions, such as whether fraud was proven,
what kind of obligation the negotiating bank should have, and should the

negotiating bank decline the negotiation in this instance, will find their own
way in Korea.
D. The Seoul High Court Decision
During the high court proceeding, the defendant bank mainly argued
the following two points.'43 First, the Hong Kong branch or the Seoul
branch could have sufficiently known or discovered that the fraudulent
transaction in this case was disguised as a letter of credit transaction before
they were informed by the defendant bank that the shipping documents of
the letters of credit were forged. Therefore, the Hong Kong branch could
not request reimbursement for the negotiation from the Seoul branch. The
defendant also insisted that under this situation, although reimbursement
for the negotiation had been made by the Seoul branch, which had issued
the letters of credit, the Seoul branch could not claim the sum from the
defendant bank as the guarantor bank for the customer.'"
Secondly, on January 9, 1992, the defendant bank, the guarantor for
Shin Han, informed the Seoul branch of the forgery notification of the
airfreight shipping documents related to the instant letters of credit. The
Seoul branch, then notified the Hong Kong branch within the hour.
Therefore, the Hong Kong branch and the Seoul branch were well aware
of the forgery. After both branches had been informed of the forgery, the
Hong Kong branch negotiated the documents for the letters of credit and
the Seoul branch reimbursed the sum of payment for the negotiation. In
other words, the defendant principally asserted that the payment was made
by credit to the savings account of Newroots by the Hong Kong branch on
January 9, 1992 - after the notice of forgery had been received. The
reimbursement of the negotiation sum by the Seoul branch was therefore
unfair. This was a flagrant breach of the principle of faithfulness and an
abuse of legal rights.'45 However, the high court concluded that it was
difficult to judge whether the Hong Kong branch and the Seoul branch
were sufficiently aware of the situation before they received the forgery

143. The arguments of the defendant were fully expressed in Seoul High Court Case 94 Na
18043, at 11-15, 31-33. The following summary is from the Supreme Court decision.
144. Supreme Court Case 96 Da 43713, 43 Pan-rye Kong-bo at 2848.
145. See id.
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notification. Therefore, the high court rejected the defendant's first
argument on the grounds that it was unsupported by the evidence."4
In addition, the high court decided that according to the evidence,
when the Hong Kong branch received the drafts and the documents for the
master letters of credit in good faith from Newroots, it could, at any time,
have appropriated reimbursement of the loaned money with the negotiation
funds by getting all the rights on the time and method for negotiation from
Newroots. 47 Therefore, on January 8, 1992 when the Hong Kong branch
heard the rumor of the Shin Han bankruptcy, it decided to negotiate the
master letters of credit, and at approximately 7:00 p.m. of the same day, it
expressed its intention and through telex communication, made it clear that
it would take the obligation for the payment of negotiation for Newroots to
the Seoul branch. 4
Under these facts, the high court ruled that, according to the I.C.C.
Commission's interpretation of "negotiation," this case could be judged as
though the negotiation had been completed, even though the Hong Kong
branch did not make payment by credit to the account for the negotiation.
The high court held that the negotiation of the letters of credit was already
complete and that Newroots undertook an obligation to make payment.
Therefore, it further ruled that it was difficult to view the measure as a
fraudulent transaction which was either a breach of the principle of
faithfulness or the abuse of legal rights, even though the Hong Kong
branch, which had obtained the documents in good faith and used them as
a collateral to withdraw the assets, had received the forgery notice the next
day and made payment by credit to Newroots' account without canceling
the completed
negotiation in order to get reimbursement for the loan
49
debt.1
Furthermore, the high court ruled that it was difficult to view the act
of the Seoul branch that reimbursed the negotiation sum to the Hong Kong
branch as a breach of the principle of faithfulness or as the abuse of legal
rights. 5o Accordingly, the high court finally concluded that the defendant's
arguments had no grounds and that it was not necessary to further review
the remaining points.

146. See Seoul High Court Case 94 Na 18043 at 18-26.
147. i at 30.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 30-31.

150. Id. at 33-35.
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E. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The Meaning of "Negotiation"
The first section of the Supreme Court decision deals with the
meaning of "negotiation" of documents in letter of credit transactions.
First, the Court explained the authority for its interpretation of
"negotiation." The Court stated that although U.C.P. 400, which applied
to each letter of credit in the instant case, did not have any definition on
"negotiation," U.C.P. 500 Article 10(b)(ii) defines "negotiation" as "the
giving of value for Draft(s) and/or document(s) by the bank authorized to
negotiate."'' Article 10(b)(ii) also states that "[m]ere examination of the
52
documents without giving of value does not constitute a negotiation."'
In addition to this definition, the Court mentioned the I.C.C. Commission
opinion contained in its Position Paper No. 2 of September 1, 1994.153 In
that position paper, the I.C.C. said that the regulations described in the
provisions of U.C.P. 500 were interpreted inaccurately as if any part of
them altered the traditional practice itself and U.C.P. 500 was just a
codification of traditional customs that had been continued." Also, the
Commission explained "giving of value" as defined in Article 10(b)(ii).'
The Court concluded that in light of such interpretation, the meaning
of "negotiation" in the provisions of U.C.P. 400 may be interpreted with
the same meaning in U.C.P. 500 and that this interpretation would be in
accord with the authoritative interpretation of the I.C.C. Commission.'56
So, even under the transaction of letters of credit to which U.C.P. 400
applied, the Court stated that the negotiation of documents can be made by
the bank authorized to negotiate through either making immediate payment
or undertaking an obligation to make payment, and that the negotiation of
documents by way of the latter method means that the negotiating bank can
replace the immediate payment of actual value by undertaking an absolute
obligation without any conditions for definite payment to the beneficiary
on a particular date.'
The Court explained the main facts related to the negotiation of the
documents. The negotiating bank of the master letters of credit, which

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Supreme Court Case 96 Da 43713, 43 Pan-rye Kong-bo at 2845.
U.C.P. art. 10(b)(ii).
See ICC POSITION PAPER, supra note 62, Position Paper No. 2.
See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See Supreme Court Case 96 Da 43713, 43 Pan-rye Kong-bo at 2845.
See id. at 2845-46.
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were sight negotiation credits, issued the back-to-back letters of credit
based on the master letters of credit upon the request of the beneficiary, the
transit trader. 5 The Court explained that in this situation the purpose of
issuing the back-to-back letters of credit or of lending money for the
settlement of account by the negotiating bank was to profit from the
interest on the loaned money with the responsibility and the burden of
financial risk on the negotiating bank itself.'59 On this point, the Court
concluded that because of the principle of independence in letter-of-credit
transactions, the legal relationships of the master letters of credit are
irrelevant and do not bind to the above-mentioned loan relationship
between the negotiating bank and the beneficiary. " The Court concluded,
therefore, that a negotiating bank's lending of money for settlement of an
account for a back-to-back letter of credit at the beginning and its receiving
of documents as a collateral cannot constitute negotiation. 6 ' According to
the Court, when a negotiating bank either makes immediate payment or
undertakes an obligation to make unconditional payment to the beneficiary,
it then can be said that the negotiation of the documents for the master
letters of credit has been completed. 162
In conclusion, the Court stated that if the negotiating bank had kept
the documents as collateral for the loan that was related to the settlement
of the back-to-back letter of credit, rather than negotiating the documents
to get reimbursement of the loan, this act alone could be considered to be
"negotiation" by way of undertaking an obligation to make payment, which
is the authoritative interpretation of "negotiation" by the I.C.C.
Commission.'63 This would be true even if the negotiating bank had
informed the issuing bank of the negotiation or had demanded
reimbursement of the negotiation sum under a situation where it had not
paid the total value of the letters of credit through a deposit to the account.
Considering the evidence in the original judgment, the Supreme Court
stated that the Hong Kong branch, in acquisition of the documents as
collateral for the loan, submitted a letter requesting negotiation.'" That
letter stated that the Hong Kong branch, if it were necessary at any time,
could unilaterally decide the time of negotiation with Newroots, negotiate
each letter of credit, and have the payment for the negotiation deposited

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at2846.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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into Newroots account with the Hong Kong branch. 65 However, the Court
also said that there was no evidence to show that the Hong Kong branch
was delegated full powers as to the method of negotiation with
Newroots.'6 Furthermore, as recognized in the original decision, the Hong
Kong branch did not pay the actual value when it made payments by credit
to Newroots account, upon hearing the Shin Han bankruptcy rumor on
January 8, 1992.167
The Court stated that even though the Hong Kong branch internally
decided to negotiate the documents for letters of credit and informed the
Seoul branch of the negotiation requesting reimbursement of the sum of
these letters of credit, it was an action taken only to express the Hong Kong
branch's internal decision to the Seoul branch, which was not the party of
negotiation. 6 The Court emphasized that Newroots was not aware of this
situation, and that the Court could not consider the Hong Kong branch as
having expressed
the intent to undertake the obligation of making payment
69
for Newroots.
According to the Court, the Hong Kong branch did not take the
responsibility of paying the beneficiary the negotiation sum.' 7 ° Also, the
Court stated that there was no indication of a special agreement between
the Hong Kong branch and Newroots for the Hong Kong branch to
undertake an obligation to make payment to Newroots and there were no
documents showing the payment of this sum to Newroots by the Hong
Kong branch; in fact, there was only a letter acknowledging
the opening of
7
the letters of credit between the two parties.' '
Following the authoritative interpretation by the I.C.C. Commission,
the Court stated that it could not find that a negotiation between the Hong
Kong branch and Newroots had occurred on January 8, 1992. " Regardless
of the original decision, in its final analysis, the Court found that the Hong
Kong branch had deposited into Newroots account the payment for the
document in agreement with the negotiation application written by
Newroots between 1:55 p.m. and 2:24 p.m. on January 9, 1992. The Court
concluded that the final negotiation was completed between the time period

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 2847.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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specified above."7 3 Therefore, because the original court decision had
concluded that the negotiation of the documents for each letter of credit had
occurred on January 8, 1992, the Supreme Court stated that the original
decision was contrary to the law and based on an incorrect interpretation
of the meaning of negotiation as well as an incorrect determination of the
time that the transaction was made. 74
2. The Fraud Rule
In the second section of its decision, the Court discussed the
application of the principle of faithfulness to cases of fraud in letters of
credit. 17 First, the Court defined the general rule in letter-of-credit
transactions. It stated that transactions with a documentary letter of credit
are performed with documents rather than with products. 76 Therefore,
according to the Court, banks must examine all documents with reasonable
care to ascertain that they appear on their face to be in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the credit, and banks are not to be burdened with
the duty of substantial inspection of shipping documents.'"
The Court, however, made an exception to this general rule. In other
words, the Court applied a Korean-style Fraud Rule where if shipping
documents are forged (including alteration or falsification), and if a bank
is involved in the forgery, knows of the forgery of the documents, or has
a reasonable suspicion of such an act, the bank cannot be protected from
the principle of independence and from the abstraction of the credits,
because it is a fraud in pretense of the letter-of-credit transactions. 78 It is
fair from the principle of faithfulness for the issuing bank to reject
reimbursement." In addition, the negotiating bank does not have a right
to ask for redemption from the issuing bank.' Even if the issuing bank
pays the sum of the letters of credit to the negotiating bank, it cannot make

173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id at 2848.
177. See id. (referring to U.C.P. 400 articles 15 and 17, and to this Court's decisions of May
28, 1985 and December 24, 1993, Korea Exchange Bank v. Kwang-Joo Bank, 84 Daka 696 (Sup.
Ct. May 28, 1985) (Korea); Kook-Min Bank Inc. v. Dong-Nan Int'l Inc., 93 Daka 15632 (Sup. CL
Dec. 24, 1993) (Korea), respectively).
178. See iad

179. See iad at 2848-49.
180. See id.
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a claim for payment of the letter of credit charge against the customer or
the customer's guarantor."'
Also, the Court said that the standard point in time to determine
whether the bank is aware of the forgery of shipping documents or has
sufficient reason to suspect such forgery is the very time of negotiation in
the case of the negotiating bank, and the standard
point in time for the
2
issuing bank is at the time of reimbursement."1
In this case, as mentioned above, when the negotiating bank issued
the back-to-back letters of credit based on the master letters of credit, it
gave a loan to the beneficiary of the master letters of credit for the payment
of the back-to-back letters of credit and received the documents for the
master letters of credit as collateral for the loan." 3 Under this situation, the
Court stated that even if the negotiating bank did not know of the forgery
when it received the documents and the property contribution was made,
but learned of the forgery of the shipping documents or had a sufficient
reason to suspect such an act before the negotiation of the documents was
completed through the account deposit, the negotiating bank could not
claim the reimbursement of the letters of credit from the issuing bank."
Reviewing the background of the instant case, the Supreme Court
stated that the goods-transactions of the sixteen letters of credit, including
the five letters of credit that were the subject of this case, were fraudulent
transactions by Shin Han, the applicant, Newroots, the beneficiary of the
master letters of credit, and Charles International, the beneficiary of the
back-to-back letters of credit because the freight shipping documents were
forged and there was no actual shipping." 5 There was no disagreement on
this point between the Supreme Court and the high court, so the materiality
of fraud was not disputed on appeal. The Supreme Court noted that both
Newroots and Charles International were subsidiaries of Shin Han and
pointed out that the Seoul branch and the Hong Kong branch knew of this
relationship.'"
The Court decided that because the instant letters of credit were not
standby letters of credit that could be issued for the finance of a money
market, but rather a documentary credit requiring the existence of goods,
the Hong Kong branch, which had loaned the funds to Newroots (a transit
trader) for its back-to-back letters of credit to Charles International and had

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id. at 2849; Kook-Min Bank, 93 Da 15632.
See Supreme Cour Case 96 Da 43713, 43 Pan-rye Kong-bo at 2849.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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received the shipping documents ofthe master letters of credit as collateral,
should have decided whether to negotiate the documents without delay
within the usual timeframe appropriate for an exchange of documents and
examination of papers.'87 The Court stated that when initiating a
negotiation, the normal procedure, in accordance with the customary
banking and trade practices, would be for the negotiating bank to send the
negotiating documents to the issuing bank and collect the loaned money
from the sum of redemption from the issuing bank.""
The Court noted that nevertheless, the Hong Kong branch did not
negotiate or collect fourteen master letters of credit (worth US$15,420,000)
for three to five months, which was beyond the time period necessary for
an exchange and inspection of documents, and but kept the documents.' 9
The Court pointed out that this ran counter to a normal letter of credit
transaction and to the customary banking and trading practices."
In addition, to explain the Hong Kong branch's irregular transactions
with the parties of the conspiracy, the Court added the following facts: the
Hong Kong branch received cash reimbursement for six other letters of
credit (worth US$6,910,000) from the financially fragile Newroots and
" ' In particular,
voided those letters of credit, sending back the papers.19
regarding the master letters of credits of the Seoul branch and the Jeil bank,
the Hong Kong branch completed the negotiations and requested
reimbursement from the Seoul branch, after the Hong Kong branch
received reimbursement from the Jeil bank for the negotiation and
completed the transactions of the letters of credit. 2 However, when the
Hong Kong branch became aware of the forgery of the airfreight shipping
documents, it canceled the negotiation of those letters of credit and
refunded the redemption money upon the request of Shin Han and
9 3
Newroots, who were afraid that the forgery might be revealed.
Thereafter, the Hong Kong branch withdrew its submission of the
documents and voided the master letters of credit. 9 4 On the request of
Newroots and Shin Han, the Hong Kong branch postponed the due date for
reimbursement of their loan and did not negotiate the shipping documents

187. See id (emphasizing that U.C.P. 500 article 14 stipulates the duration for the document
examination be the 7th banking day from the receiving date).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
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after receiving repayment of the loaned money in Hong Kong.'95 The Court
said that this kind of transaction could not be found in normal documentary
credit transactions, which are based on the premise of cargo shipping. 96
The Court stated that the December audit conducted by the Hong
Kong branch's main office staff indicated that the Hong Kong branch had
received the payments in Hong Kong without negotiating the shipping
documents, and thus, the Hong Kong branch itself was well aware that its
transaction with Newroots was irregular. 197 The Court found that the Hong
Kong branch had dealt irregularly with the letter-of-credit transactions, and
that at 10:00 a.m. on January 9, 1992, it had received notification of the
forgery of the airfreight shipping documents of each letter of credit along
with stop payment requests from the defendant bank through its Seoul
branch.' The Court added that the Hong Kong branch also had received
another forgery notification about the airfreight shipping documents of
Shin Han that related to letters of credit from the Korea Commercial Bank
at around 10:40 a.m. on the same day."9
On the facts in evidence, the Court found the applicant, Shin Han,
which was the parent corporation of Newroots, the beneficiary of the five
master letters of credit and Charles International, the beneficiary of the
back-to-back letters of credit, went into bankruptcy due to insufficient
funds.2 °° Having heard of the forgery of the Shin Han-related shipping
documents, the Hong Kong branch also was investigating the genuineness
of the facts reported by the Seoul branch.2' The Hong Kong branch
received notification of the forgery of other airfreight shipping documents
behind letters of credit of Shin Han subsidiaries, Newroots and Charles
International, from other Korean banks and that had already been
negotiated and sent.202
The Court said that in the view of these notifications, it was quite
likely that the remaining shipping documents for each of the letters of
credit also might be forged.20 3 The Court held that under these
circumstances, the bank authorized for negotiation should have reexamined
the shipping documents thoroughly and contacted the beneficiary, the

195. See id.
196. See id. at 2849-50.
197. See id. at 2850.
198. See id.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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See
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issuing bank, or the shipping company, to confirm the forgery. 4 The bank
should have decided on the negotiation, only after taking such action. °5
The Court stated that the Hong Kong branch, however, was too eager to be
reimbursed for the loan, and it deposited the entire amount of over
US$15,450,000 into Newroots' bank account in exchange for the
documents of each letter of credit without taking any precautionary
actions.2"
The Court said that the Seoul branch originally introduced Shin Han
to the Hong Kong branch, initiating these transactions. 20 " Thus, as the
bankruptcy of Shin Han became certain, the Seoul branch requested that
the Hong Kong branch negotiate the documents for letters of credit if there
were any remaining letters of credit that had not yet been processed. 208 The
Court stated that it seems from these facts that the Seoul branch and the
had kept in close contact with each other regarding the
Hong Kong branch
2°
letters of credit.
Finally, the Court concluded that when the Hong Kong branch made
payment to the Newroots account at some time between 1:55 p.m. and 2:24
p.m. on January 9, 1992, it was the very time that the negotiation of the
documents was completed, and that at the time, the Hong Kong branch
knew or had sufficient reason to suspect that these letter-of-credit
transactions were being used fraudulently by Shin Han and that the related
airfreight shipping documents were forged. '0 According to the Court, the
Seoul branch also knew or had a sufficient reason to believe that the
forgery of the documents occurred before the reimbursement for the
negotiation.2 '
Therefore, the Court stated that in view of the principles of law, the
Seoul branch should not have reimbursed the sum prescribed in the letters
of credit to the Hong Kong branch, and the Hong Kong branch did not have
22
a right to claim the redemption for the negotiation from the Seoul branch.
Thus, even if the Seoul branch had already paid the sum for the letters of
credit to the Hong Kong branch, it could not request the payment from the
defendant for the sum described in the letters of credit.21 3
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See id.
See id
See id
See id.
See id.
See id
See id
See id.
See id.
See id
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Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that the original decision stated
that when the Hong Kong branch decided to negotiate these letters of credit
on January 8, 1992, which was when the Hong Kong branch sent the
message to the Seoul branch, the negotiation of the letters of credit had
already been completed.2" 4 Therefore, although the original court
recognized that the Hong Kong branch had received the forgery notification
at 10:00 a.m. on January 9, it did not decide whether the Hong Kong
branch knew or had a sufficient reason to know about forgery.2"
The original court ruled that it was difficult to decide whether the
deposit for the negotiation into the Newroots' account, without voiding it
as a fraud, was either a breach of the principle of faithfulness, or an abuse
of legal rights.216 Also, the original decision ruled that it was difficult to
view the action of the Seoul branch, which repaid the sum for the
negotiation to the Hong Kong branch who had a right to claim the
repayment, as a breach of the principle of faithfulness or a abuse of legal
rights."' On this point, therefore, the Court concluded that the original
judgment misinterpreted the legal principles of fraudulent transactions in
letters of credit in the case.2 s
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE AND THE

U.C.P.

A. The Nature of UC.P.500
One of the main questions in Supreme Court Case 96 Da 43713 is
whether U.C.P. 500 provisions would be applicable to the letter-of-credit
transactions to which the parties had agreed to apply U.C.P. 400. The
Supreme Court used the specific provision in U.C.P. 500 as an important
tool for interpretation of U.C.P. 400. Basically, this question is related to
the legal nature of the U.C.P. There have been several opinions put forth
by lawyers and professors in Korea regarding the legal nature of the
U.C.P. 2 9 The main point in this debate is the applicable scope of the
U.C.P. when there is no agreement between the parties. In other words,
whether the U.C.P. could be used as a source of law in the absence of an

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See id. at 2851.
See id
See id
See id.
See id.

219. See JOONG-WON RYou, SHiNYONGJANG-YOt BEOPRi rE THEORY OF THE LETTERs oF
CREDIT] 86-88 (Yook Beob Sa, Korea 1993).
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express agreement.2 20 The U.C.P. provisions are not themselves law, and
the I.C.C. has no authority to legislate. To the extent that they describe
banking practice, they might reflect trade usage. However, it is not clear
that the mere assertion of the general provisions makes the U.C.P. evidence
of trade usage. Presumably, in any litigation, the parties may show that
usage and the U.C.P. differ.22 '
In the United States, U.C.P. 500 is applicable to all documentary
credits and is binding on all parties unless expressly stated otherwise.222
U.C.C. Article 5 defers to the broad scope of U.C.P. 500.223 Article 5 states
that "'[w]here the U.C.P. [is] adopted but conflict[s] with Article 5 and
except where variation is prohibited, the U.C.P. terms are permissible
contractual modifications under sections 1-102(3) and 5-103(c).' ,224 If
U.C.P. 500 is incorporated into in the agreement, it governs different terms
than U.C.C. Article 5, as long as variation is permitted by U.C.C. Article
5.225 However, if U.C.P. 500 is specifically rejected by the parties, it does
not apply. 226 "When the parties in a jurisdiction governed by U.C.C.
Article 5 are silent on the issue, U.C.P.227 500 might apply to the credit
because it evidences a specific custom.
As discussed above, Article 1 of the Korean Civil Code provides that
"[i]f there is no provision... applicable to certain [cases], the customary
law shall apply to them, and if there is no customary law applicable to
them, sound reasoning shall apply. '22 ' Also, regarding the role of custom
in civil affairs, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides that if "there is a
custom which differs from any provisions of laws or ordinances which are
not concerned with good morals or other social order, and the intention
of
229
the parties to a juristic act is not clear, such custom shall prevail.,
"Custom" means understood rules of conduct that are "generally
followed in a society, although they are not officially recognized., 23 0 The
question arises whether custom is therefore a source of law.23 ' This

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See id.
See JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETrERS OF CREDIT § 3.01 (2d ed. 1991).
See Barski, supra note 31, at 739 (citing U.C.P. 500 art. 1).
See id.
Id. (quoting U.C.C. art. 5, § 5-103 cmt. 2) (alteration in original).
See id
See id. (citing U.C.P. 500 art. 1).
Id (citing U.C.C. art. 5, § 5-108(e)).
KoREAN CIvL CODE art. 1.
Id art. 106.
Sang-Hyun Song, supra note 116, at 189.
See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/2

34

Chae: Letters of Credit
andOF
the
UniformUC.P.
Customs
LE7TERS
CREDITAND
500 and Practice for Docume

longstanding question remains unanswered.2 32 Custom is generally
considered a source of law in Korea.233 "Custom that is not contrary to
public order or morality has the normative value of law, provided that it is
not excluded by statute." 2
The key question in this instant case is whether U.C.P. 500 can be
said to be the custom in international letter-of-credit transactions. It cannot
be denied that U.C.P. 500 is used in most international letters of credit and
that the international practices in U.C.P. 500 are employed by a large
number of users of letters of credit as well. According to the I.C.C.,
U.C.P. 500 had to address new developments in the transport industry and
new technological applications and was intended to improve the
functioning of the U.C.P. 3 5
A mandate of the I.C.C. Working Group was that U.C.P. 500
"incorporate international banking practices, as well as to facilitate and
' The Working Group also considered
standardize developing practices."236
future changes in documentary credit.237 The Working Group choose as its
working draft a document based on I.C.C. National Committee practices,
important international judicial decisions, the Banking Commission's
opinions and decisions, and case studies from the last twenty years to create
a set of general rules.23 ' For example, U.C.P. 500 Article 13(a) refers to
"international standard banking practice as reflected in these Articles" in
whether such
letter-of-credit transactions.239 However, it is questionable
240
an international standard banking practice even exists.
In the instant case, it would be difficult to say that the Supreme Court
directly applied U.C.P. 500 to this case as a source of law. Simply, it
would be correct to say that the Court adopted a way of thinking and
interpretation from the specific provision in U.C.P. 500 for its
interpretation of U.C.P. 400. In other words, the Court accepted the
definition that was adopted in the later version of the U.C.P. However, it
cannot be denied that the Court put the wide scope of effect on U.C.P. 500
beyond the intention of the parties in the transaction.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See id.
See id.
Id
See U.C.P. 500, preface, at 4.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 5.
Id art. 13(a).

240. See Ross P. Buckley, The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practicefor

Documentary Credits' 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 265, 279 n.92 (1995).
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Therefore, even though U.C.P. 500 could not be said to be one of the
sources of law in letter-of-credit transactions, it contains useful provisions
from which to infer the intention of parties and interpret provisions in
contracts. In the absence of any statute governing letter-of-credit
transactions and any other authoritative interpretations that might. be
applicable to the case at hand, U.C.P. 500 might be a subsidiary source of
law that a court could apply as a reasonable basis for its judgment.
B. The Definitionof Negotiation: UC.P. 500Article 10(b)(ii)

In this instant case, due to the importance of the time when the
negotiating bank became aware of the fraud and forgery, the Korean
Supreme Court had to decide when the negotiation of the letters of credit

was completed in order to apply the fraud exception to this case. But
U.C.P. 400, which the parties had agreed to apply to these transactions, had
no specific provision about the definition of "negotiation," so the question
of how the Court can define and interpret the "negotiation" of letters of
credit remains unanswered.
As mentioned above, U.C.P. 500 Article 10(b)(ii) defines
"negotiation" as "the giving of value for Draft(s) and/or document(s) by the
bank authorised to negotiate" and notes that "[m]ere examination of the
documents without giving of value does not constitute a negotiation. 241
In addition, the I.C.C. Commission explained that the phrase "giving of

value" may be interpreted as either making immediate payment or
undertaking an obligation to make payment.242

The Supreme Court and the Seoul High Court agreed that the
interpretation of negotiation in U.C.P. 400 could be and should follow the
definition given in U.C.P. 500 and the opinion of the I.C.C. Commission.
However, the courts disagreed on the exact meaning of "giving of value"
and "undertaking an obligation to make payment." According to the
additional interpretation by the Supreme Court of the opinion of the I.C.C.
Commission, the negotiation of documents by way of undertaking an
obligation to make payment means that the negotiating bank can replace
the immediate payment of actual value by undertaking an absolute
obligation without any conditions for definite payment (giving of value) to
the beneficiary on a particular date.
In the instant case, the negotiating transaction was made through these
three steps. First, the negotiating bank loaned funds to the beneficiary for
the settlement of the back-to-back letters of credit, and then the negotiation
241. U.C.P. art. 10(b)(ii).
242. I.C.C. POSITION PAPER, supra note 62, Position Paper No. 2.
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bank received the documents for the master letters of credit as collateral.
Second, the negotiating bank merely decided internally to negotiate these
documents in order to get reimbursement for the loaned funds. The bank
then informed the issuing bank of the negotiation and demanded
reimbursement of the negotiation sum. Third, the negotiating bank
deposited payment for the documents into the account of the beneficiary.
The Seoul High Court ruled that the negotiation was completed with
the second step. However, without any specific evidence that shows a
special agreement on the method of negotiation between the negotiating
bank and the beneficiary, the second step was a legally insignificant action
taken only to relay the negotiating bank's internal decision to the issuing
bank, who was not a party to the negotiation, and to the beneficiary, who
was not aware of the situation.
As to the effective time of declaration of intention, Article 11 1
section (1) of the Korean Civil Code provides that "a declaration of
intention made to a party shall be effective as from the time when notice
'
thereof has reached the other party."243
Therefore, in this case, the
negotiating bank could not be considered as having expressed the intent to
undertake the obligation of making payment for the beneficiary. Thus, the
conclusion of the high court on this point had no basis, as the negotiating
bank did not take the responsibility of paying the beneficiary the sum of
negotiation at that time. In other words, it would be appropriate to say that
the final negotiation was completed in the third step, which was the
conclusion of the Supreme Court.
C The FraudRule
The concept of "fraud (Sagi)" in Korea in legal activities is expressed
in Article I 10 of the Korean Civil Code, which provides that "a declaration
of intention induced by fraud or duress may be voidable." 2" Fraud is
established when a deceitful act by one party causes a mistake to be made

243. KOREAN CIVIL CODE art. 111(1).
244. Id. art. 110 (Declaration of Intention by Fraud or Duress) provides as following:
(1) A declaration of intention induced by fraud or duress may be voidable.
(2) If a third person has been guilty of fraud or duress in respect to a declaration
of intention made to a person, such declaration of intention may be voidable only
in case the other party was aware, or should have been aware, of the fact.
(3) The voidance of a declaration of intention under the preceding two paragraphs
cannot be set up against a bonafide third person.
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by the other and induces the mistaken party to make a declaration of
intention. However, not all the deceitful acts can be considered "illegal,"
and the illegality is determined in light of the situation in each case.24 5 This
voidable juristic act continues to exist unless the defrauded party declares
its intention to void it.2' This legal theory of fraud can be used in regard
to the parties to original contracts between an issuing bank and the
customer, but not to a negotiating bank and a guarantor bank. The general
idea and concept of fraud in this theory is a very important tool in
determining fraud in the instant case.
In this case, the Supreme Court used the good faith principle, which
in Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "the exercise of rights and
performance of duties shall be in good faith and in accordance with the
'
principles of trust."247
This general and basic idea regulating all juristic
acts is ambiguous and only has been developed by courts in specific cases.
The situation is similar to that in common law countries.
U.C.C. Article 5 clearly states that the issuer may honor the letter of
credit even in the face of the applicant's claim of fraud, and it also makes
clear that the issuer may dishonor and defend that dishonor by showing
fraud.24' Because of possible liability for wrongful dishonor, most issuers
under Article 5 may choose to honor despite an applicant's claims of fraud
unless the applicant gets an injunction. The fact that the issuer has a right
to dishonor does not mean it has a duty to the applicant to dishonor. The
applicant's normal recourse is to procure an injunction. If the applicant is
unable to procure an injunction, the applicant will have a claim against the
issuer only in the rare case where the applicant can show that the issuer did
not honor in good faith.249 In spite of these guidelines, there are still
several practical problems in applying the fraud exception to specific letterof-credit transactions. For example, questions remain as to what facts and
evidence are needed for the assertion of fraud, what kinds of duties and
obligations the negotiating bank has in case of an assertion of fraud, and
who has the burden of proof with respect to the fraud.

245. See 3 DoING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, pt. 1,ch. 2, at 1-41 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1994).
Article 96 ofthe Civil Code of Japan is almost same as Article 110 of the Civil Code of Korea. So,
the interpretation of those provisions and the concept of fraud is almost same.
246. See KOREAN CIVIL CODE art. 102(1). By contrast, KOREAN CIVIL CODE art. 103 (Juristic
Acts Contrary to Social Order) provides that "[a] juristic act which has for its object such matters
as are contrary to good morals and other social order shall be null and void." This void juristic act
does not legally exist and is invalid ab initio.
247. Id. art. 102(1).
248. See U.C.C. § 5-109(a)(2).
249. See id.§ 5-109, cmt. 3.
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The instant case was based on fraudulent transactions by the applicant
and the beneficiaries of the master letters of credit and the back-to-back
letters of credit concerning the forging of the freight shipping documents.
Since it is a material and clear case of fraud, one cannot find any useful
standard for judging the boundaries of fraud in the case. However, through
the entire judgment of this case, compared with the above-mentioned
Article 5 provisions, the Supreme Court expressed strong interest in
protecting the innocent party in fraudulent transactions. Actually, the
Supreme Court focused on the low cost and efficiency of letter-of-credit
transactions and the protection of the international banking system. The
Court said that transactions with a documentary letter of credit are
performed with documents rather than with products, and therefore banks
must examine all documents with reasonable care to ascertain that on their
face the documents are in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
credit. However, banks are not to be burdened with the duty of substantial
inspection of shipping documents.
The Supreme Court clearly expressed that in a case of fraud, where
the shipping documents have been forged (including alteration or
falsification), if a bank is involved in the forgery, or knows of the forgery
of the documents, or has a reasonable suspicion of such an act, the bank
cannot be protected from the principle of independence and abstraction of
the credits. The Court also stated that in the case of the negotiating bank,
the standard point in time to determine whether a bank knows about the
forgery of shipping documents or has sufficient reason to suspect such a
forgery is the very time of negotiation and in the case of the issuing bank,
it is at the time of reimbursement. Under these standards, when a bank has
sufficient reason to suspect forgery or fraud, the Supreme Court imposes
an additional duty on the bank. The Court said that normally in such a
circumstance, the authorized bank for negotiation should reexamine the
shipping documents thoroughly and should contact the beneficiary, or the
issuing bank, or the shipping company in order to confirm the forgery. The
bank then should decide on the negotiation after taking such actions.
Apparently, this rule has no exception in cases of third-party fraud or
cases without any preliminary injunction. This broad exception and high
duty on a bank would harm the basic framework of international letter-ofcredit transactions and the stability ofthe world-wide banking system. The
Court showed a stronger intent to protect an innocent party in fraud cases
than does U.C.C. Article 5. Generally, under Article 5, the mere allegation
of fraud cannot stop a bank from paying.
In the instant case, the negotiating bank received the notice of forgery
from another "bank," which was the guarantor to the applicant, and the
status of this reliable financial institution seemed to be fully considered in
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addition to other facts. The Supreme Court especially emphasized that the
negotiating bank, the Hong Kong branch, had performed abnormal and
irregular transactions that could not be reconciled with normal
documentary credit transactions, which are based on cargo shipping.
The basic spirit of the law regarding letters of credit would be the
efficiency of transactions concerning the sale of goods, and the most
important player in this situation would be the bank. If a bank itself
performs these kinds of irregular and abnormal practices, it does not
deserve the protection of U.C.P. 500, U.C.C. Article 5, or other legal
theories. The conclusion of the Court in this case is very appropriate to the
stability of future banking systems and practices.
D. The Burden of Proofin a FraudCase
The Supreme Court remained silent about who has the burden of
proof as to fraud in the instant case. However, the high court stated that the
burden is on the party who asserts the fraud - in the instant case, the
guarantor bank of the applicant.25 The high court also felt that the
evidence of fraud should have been "clear" to the bank; therefore, the
burden would be very high.25
"' The Supreme Court did not refute the
position of the high court on this issue.
Due to the structure of U.C.C. Article 5, the U.S. courts provide
different interpretations on this point. In United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge
Sporting Goods Corp.,252 the banks asserted that they were holders in due
course of the drafts. But, at trial, the banks introduced no evidence other
than answers to several of the written interrogatories.' 3 The trial court and
the Appellate Division concluded that the burden of proving that the banks
were not holders in due course lay with Cambridge Sporting Goods and
directed a verdict in favor of the banks on the ground that Cambridge
Sporting Goods had not met that burden of proof.2"' However, the Court
of Appeals of New York reversed and held that it was improper to direct
a verdict in favor of the petitioning banks.255 The Court concluded that the
defense of fraud in the transaction had been established, and under these

circumstances, the burden shifted to the petitioners to prove that they were

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Seoul High Court Case 94 Na 18043 at 17.
Id.
360 N.E. 2d 943 (N.Y. 1976).
See id. at 950.
See id.
See id. at 950-52.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/2

40

Chae: Letters of Credit
and the
Uniform Customs
LETERS
OF CREDITAND
UC.P. 500 and Practice for Docume

holders in due course and had taken the drafts for value in good faith and

without notice of any fraud. 56

VI. CONCLUSION.

With the increased use of letters of credit in international trade, the
need for legal uniformity is important for the practitioners in this field.
U.C.P. 500 has provided and will continue to provide a useful standard for
this goal. On the problem of the fraud exception in letters of credit, U.C.C.
Article 5 also provides good guidelines for the courts in otherjurisdictions.
However, due to the diversity of legal systems and the increasing
complexity of letter-of-credit transactions, the effectiveness of U.C.P. 500
will be threatened. Even though Korea is not a common law country and
the future effects of specific case decisions are limited, the judgment in this
case provides useful guidance to banks and other practitioners in foreign
jurisdictions who do business in Korea for matters concerning fraud in
letter-of-credit transactions.

256. See id.
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VII. APPENDIX 1
An abridged translation of the Supreme Court Decision
Case Number: 96 Da 43713 (Aug. 29, 1997)217
Supreme Court
Second Div.
Case No.: 96 Da 43713258
Name: Letters of Credit
[2845]
Plaintiff (Appellee): Paris National Bank, Inc.
Defendant (Appellant): Hanil bank, Inc.
Original Decision: Seoul High Court Case No.94 Na 18043 (Aug.
28, 1996)
Ruling: Reversed the case and remanded.
Reasoning:
[This was a unanimous decision, and the Court opinion was delivered
by Justice Man-Ho Park.]
1. Regarding the matter described in the first section, which is related to
the misinterpretation of legal principles and the misunderstanding of the
facts and application of the meaning of "negotiation" pertaining to
documents for letters of credit:
A. The 1983 revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (4th Amendment, 1983, U.C.P. 400), which applies
to each letter of credit in the instant case, did not contain a definition of
"negotiation." However, in the 1993 revision ofthe Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits (5th Amendment, 1993, U.C.P. 500),
Article 10(b)(ii) defines "negotiation" as: "[T]he giving of value for
Draft(s) and/or document(s) by the bank authorized to negotiate. Mere
examination of the documents without giving of value does not constitute
a negotiation."
The International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.) Commission on
Banking Technique and Practice took the position, in its Position Paper No.
2 of September 1, 1994, that the regulations described in the provisions of
257. This translation of the Supreme Court Case 96 Da 43713 is based on the understanding
of this case by the author of this article. The bracketed contents and other explanatory notes in this
text were added by the author to facilitate understanding the English version. The numbers in the
brackets refer to the pages in the official publication of the Supreme Court of Korea, Pan-ryeKongbo No. 43, on October 1, 1997.

258. In Korea, cases are generally named and defined by the court that decides the case, the
date of the decision (i.e., the date of sentence in Korea), and the case number.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/2
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U.C.P. 500 were interpreted inaccurately, as indicating that any part of the
provisions alter customary practice. The I.C.C. said that U.C.P. 500 was
merely a codification of customary practices. Also, they explained U.C.P.
500 Article 10(b)(ii) as follows: "[T]he phrase 'giving of value' ... may
be interpreted as either 'making immediate payment' (e.g. by cash, by
check, by remittance through a Clearing System or by credit to an account)
or 'undertaking an obligation to make payment' (other than giving a
deferred payment undertaking or accepting a draft)."
In light of this interpretation, the meaning of "negotiation" in the
provisions of U.C.P. 400 may be interpreted as being the same as that of
U.C.P. 500 and the authoritative interpretation of the I.C.C. Commission.
Therefore, even with regard to letter-of-credit transactions to which U.C.P.
400 applies, the -negotiation of documents can be made by the bank
authorized to negotiate through either making immediate payment (for
example, by cash, check, remittance through a clearing system, or credit to
an account) or undertaking an obligation to make payment. Here, the
negotiation of documents by way of the latter method means [2846] that
the negotiating bank can replace the immediate payment of actual value by
undertaking an absolute obligation without any conditions for definite
payment (giving of value) to the beneficiary on a particular date.
In this case, the negotiating bank of the master letters of credit, which
were sight negotiation credits, issued the back-to-back letters of credit
based on the master letters of credit upon the request of the beneficiary, the
transit trader. The negotiating bank then loaned funds for the settlement of
the back-to-back letters of credit to the beneficiary, who was negotiating
the documents of the master letters of credit, and received the documents
of the master letters of credit as collateral for the loaned money. In this
situation, the purpose of issuing the back-to-back letters of credit and
lending money for the settlement of the account was so that the negotiating
bank could profit from the interest on the loaned money while assuming the
responsibility and the burden of the financial risk. Under the principle of
independence in letter-of-credit transactions (U.C.P. 400 Article 3), the
legal obligations of a master letter of credit are irrelevant and are not
binding on back-to-back letters of credit. Therefore, the fact that the
negotiating bank lent money for the settlement of the account for the
back-to-back letters of credit at the start and received documents as
collateral does not constitute negotiation.
When a negotiating bank either makes immediate payment or
undertakes an obligation to make unconditional payment to a beneficiary,
it can be said that the negotiation of documents pertaining to master letters
of credit is complete. However, if the negotiating bank keeps the
documents as collateral for the loan related to the settlement of the
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back-to-back letters of credit, after deciding to negotiate the documents in
order to receive reimbursement for the loan, such an act alone cannot be
considered to be "negotiation" by way of undertaking an obligation to make
payment, which is the authoritative interpretation of "negotiation" by the
I.C.C. Commission. This is true even if the negotiating bank informs the
issuing bank of the negotiation or demands reimbursement of the
negotiation sum when it has not paid the actual value by way of a deposit
to the account.
B. According to the original decision, when the Hong Kong branch 259
received the drafts and the documents of the master letters of credit in good
faith from Newroot, 2 ' it could, by obtaining all the rights pertaining to the
time and method of negotiation from Newroots, at any time, have requested
reimbursement of the loan from the negotiation funds. Therefore, on
hearing the rumor of the bankruptcy of Shin Han26 on January 8, 1992, the
Hong Kong branch decided to negotiate the master letters of credit. At
approximately 7:00 p.m. on the same day, it expressed its intention to
negotiate the documents and made clear, through telex communication, that
it would assume the obligation of Newroots for the payment of the
negotiation to the Seoul branch.262 On these facts, the high court decided
that, according to the interpretation of "negotiation" by the I.C.C.
Commission, this case could be judged as though the negotiation were
complete, even though the Hong Kong branch did not make payment for
the negotiation by crediting the account.
However, when comparing the quoted evidence of original judgment
with the records, it is evident that the Hong Kong branch, in its acquisition
of the documents as collateral for the loaned money, merely submitted a
letter of request for negotiation. The letter stated that the Hong Kong
branch, if it felt it necessary at any time, could unilaterally decide the time
of the negotiation with Newroots, negotiate each letter of credit, and have
the payment for the negotiation deposited into the Newroots account,
established at the Hong Kong branch. [2847] But, there was no evidence
to show that the Hong Kong branch had been delegated full powers on the
method of negotiation with Newroots.
259. This refers to the Paris National Bank"Hong Kong branch. This was the negotiating bank
of the five master letters of credit in this instant case, and the issuer of the back-to-back letters of
credit in this case.
260. Newsroots was the seller and the buyer: the beneficiary of the five master letters of credit
in this instant case and the applicant of the back-to-back letters of credit in this case.
261. Shin Han was the buyer: the applicant of the five master letters of credit in this instant
case.

262. The Seoul branch refers to the Paris National Bank Seoul branch (the plaintiff in this
case). This was the issuing bank of the five master letters of credit in this instant case.
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Furthermore, as recognized in the original decision, upon hearing the
bankruptcy rumor concerning Shin Han on January 8, 1992, the Hong
Kong branch did not pay the full value when it made payments by credit to
the account ofNewroots, the beneficiary. So, even though the Hong Kong
branch, when it decided to negotiate the documents of the letters of credit,
informed the Seoul branch of the negotiation and requested reimbursement
of the sum of the letters of credit, it did so solely to inform the Seoul
branch, which was not the party of negotiation, of the Hong Kong branch's
internal decision. Newroots was not aware of the situation, and
consequently, it could not be considered that the Hong Kong branch had
expressed the intent of undertaking the obligation to make payment for
Newroots.
Therefore, the Hong Kong branch did not undertake the responsibility
of paying the beneficiary the sum of the negotiation. There was no
indication of a special agreement between the Hong Kong branch and
Newroots for undertaking the obligation to make payment or of any
documents recognizing the payment of this sum to Newroots by the Hong
Kong branch. There was only a letter of correspondence, noted above,
between the two parties. Hence, on the only ground recognized in the
original decision, this Court cannot find that a negotiation, as understood
by the I.C.C. Commission, occurred between the Hong Kong branch and
Newroots on January 8, 1992.
C. In the final analysis, despite what the original decision recognized,
according to the facts in the case, the Hong Kong branch deposited the
payment for the documents into Newroots' account in agreement with the
negotiation application written by Newroots on January 9, 1992 between
1:55 p.m. and 2:24 p.m. The final negotiation was completed during this
time period.
D. The original court decision, however, concluded that the
negotiation of the documents of each letter of credit had occurred on
January 8, 1992. First, this Court finds that the original decision was
contrary to the law, misinterpretating legal principles relating to the
meaning of the liegotiation of letter of credit documents and the timing of
such a transaction, as well as admitting unlawful items of evidence.
2. Regarding the matter described in the second section, which concerns
the misinterpretation of legal principles related to fraudulent letter-of-credit
transactions:
A. According to original decision, the defendant bank argued first that
the Hong Kong branch or the Seoul branch could have had sufficient
knowledge or discovered that the fraudulent transactions in this case were
disguised as letter-of-credit transactions before they were informed of the
forgery by the defendant bank, and that the letter of credit shipping
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documents were forged, as no goods were shipped. Therefore, the Hong
Kong branch could not request the reimbursement of the negotiation from
the Seoul branch. The defendant also insisted that under this situation,
despite the fact that reimbursement for the negotiation had been made by
the Seoul branch, which had issued the master letters of credit, the Seoul
branch could not claim the sum from the defendant bank as the guarantor
bank for the applicant. However, the high court concluded that it was
difficult to judge whether the Hong Kong branch and the Seoul branch had
sufficient knowledge of the situation before they received the forgery
notification. And, therefore, the court rejected this argument as due to
insufficient evidence.
Secondly, the defendant bank, the guarantor for Shin Han, argued that
on January 9, 1992, it had informed the Seoul branch about the forgery
notification of the airfreight shipping documents related to the letters of
credit. Since the Seoul branch then notified the Hong Kong branch within
the hour, the defendant insisted that the Hong Kong branch and the Seoul
branch knew quite well of the forgery. After both branches had been
informed of the forgery, the Hong Kong branch negotiated the documents
of the letters of credit, and the Seoul branch then reimbursed the sum of
payment for the negotiation. In other words, the defendant principally
asserted that the payment made by credit to the savings account of
Newroots by the Hong Kong branch on January 9, 1992 was made after the
notification of the forgery, therefore, the reimbursement of the negotiating
fund by the Seoul branch was improper. According to the defendant, this
was a flagrant breach of the principle of faithfulness and an abuse of legal
rights.
Then, the high court found the following facts on the evidence: [2848]
Wan-Yel Lee and Min-Chul Lee, staff members of the defendant, the Hanil
Bank, investigated the documents after having received a request for the
reimbursement of the sum of the letters of credit from the Hong Kong
branch. While reviewing the shipping documents, they discovered the
forgery of the airfreight shipping papers. Then, they visited the Seoul
branch at about 10:00 a.m. on January 9, 1992 (based on Korean time,
Hong Kong time is one hour behind) and explained the situation to ManSoo Lee, the manager of the Seoul branch, and Sae-Chul Kim, the director
of the same branch. During the visit, Wan-Yel Lee and Min-Chul Lee said
that they already had made an inquiry to the company that had issued the
airfreight shipping papers and confirmed the forgery of the airfreight
shipping papers relating to the same parties. They also explained that they
were notified of the forgery of airfreight shipping papers relating to the
instant letters of credit as well. Thereafter, Sae-Chul Kim verified this with
the Hong Kong branch, who replied that the negotiation of the letters of
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credit had already been completed. Later, Wan-Yel Lee [of the Hanil
Bank] confirmed this in writing to the Seoul branch on the afternoon of the
same day.
In the meantime, the Korea Commercial Bank, Inc. discovered the
forgery of other airfreight shipping papers associated with a letter of
credit263 that it had issued. The Korean Commercial Bank notified the
Hong Kong branch at 10:40 a.m. on January 9, 1992 that these airfreight
shipping papers were forged and informed the Hong Kong branch that the
associated letter of credit was void.
The Hong Kong branch deposited the sum for the negotiation of the
letters of credit specified by Newroots between 1:55 p.m. and 2:24 p.m. on
the same day, January 9. The manager of the Hanil Bank's (the defendant)
Hong Kong branch visited the Hong Kong branch (of the plaintiff bank) at
4:00 p.m. on the same day, informing them of the forgery and requesting
a stop payment on the documents. The Hong Kong branch forwarded the
shipping documents for the letters of credit to the issuing bank (the Seoul
branch) at 6:03 p.m. on the same day. Then, it closed the savings account
of Newroots on January 10 and 11. The Hong Kong branch appropriated
funds from the closed account in order to reimburse the loaned money to
settle the account of the back-to-back letters of credit and deposited the
balance to another Newroots account. The Seoul branch received the
necessary documents relating to the letters of credit from the Hong Kong
branch and confirmed the consistency ofthe documents, then it reimbursed
the sum for negotiation on January 10.
Under these facts and on the opinion that the negotiation of the letters
of credit was already complete, the high court ruled that even though the
Hong Kong branch, which on January 8 had obtained the documents in
good faith to be used as collateral to withdraw the assets, received the
forgery notice the next day and still made payment to Newroots' account
in order be reimbursed for the loan without canceling the completed
negotiation, it was difficult to view this action as a fraudulent transaction,
which is either a breach of the principle of faithfulness or the abuse of legal
rights.
Furthermore, the high court ruled that it was difficult to view
reimbursement of the negotiation sum to the Hong Kong branch by the
Seoul branch as a breach of the principle of faithfulness or as the abuse of
legal rights. The high court finally concluded that the defendant's

263. This letter of credit was not the subject of this instant case. The Court explained some
additional facts on the other letters of credit transactions with the same parties in this case as
support for the conclusion of the Court.
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arguments had no grounds and that it was not necessary to further review
the remaining points.
B. Transactions with a documentary letter of credit are performed
with documents rather than with products. Therefore, "[blanks must
examine all documents with reasonable care to ascertain that they appear
on their face to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
credit." Banks are not to be burdened with the duty of substantial
inspection of shipping documents. (U.C.P. 400 Article 15 and 17; this
Court's decision on May 28, 1985, 84 Daka 696 and on Dec. 24, 1993, 93
Daka 15632, for reference).
However, where shipping documents are forged (including alteration
or falsification), if a bank is involved or knows of or has a reasonable
suspicion of the forgery of the documents, the bank cannot be protected by
the so-called independence or abstraction principle of letters of credit
because the transaction is a fraud in pretense of a letter of credit
transaction. Thus, where shipping documents are forged, if an issuing bank
knew or had enough reason to suspect that the letter of credit documents
were forged at the time of reimbursement and that the negotiating bank
itself was involved or knew or had sufficient reason to suspect forgery of
the documents, [2849] it is appropriate, based on the principle of
faithfulness, for the issuing bank to reject reimbursement. In this situation,
the negotiating bank does not have a right to ask for redemption from the
issuing bank. But, if the issuing bank were to pay the sum of the letters of
credit to the negotiating bank, it could not then claim payment from either
the applicant or the guarantor of the applicant. (This Court decision on
Dec. 24, 1993, 93 Daka 15632 for reference).
As stated above, the standard point in time that determines whether
a negotiating bank, as related to letter-of-credit transactions, knew of the
forgery of shipping documents or had sufficient reason to suspect such a
forgery, is the very time of negotiation. The standard point in time for an
issuing bank is the time of reimbursement.
In the instant case, when the negotiating bank issued the back-to-back
letters of credit based on the master letters of credit, it gave a loan to the
beneficiary of the master letters of credit for the payment of the
back-to-back letters of credit. The negotiating bank then received the
documents for the master letters of credit as collateral for the loan. Even
if the negotiating bank did not know of the forgery at the time of initially
receiving the documents and the contribution of property, but later became
aware of the forgery of the shipping documents or had sufficient reason to
suspect such an act before the negotiation of the documents was completed,
by way of the account deposit, the negotiating bank cannot claim the
reimbursement of the letters of credit from the issuing bank.
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C. Looking back over the instant case, as acknowledged by the
original decision, the goods transactions of sixteen letters of credit,
including the five master letters of credit that are the subject of this court
case, were fraudulent transactions by the conspiracy of Shin Han (the
applicant), Newroots (the beneficiary of the letters of credit) and Charles
International (the beneficiary of the back-to-back letters of credit) for
forging the freight shipping documents without any actual shipping.
Newroots and Charles International were both subsidiaries of Shin
Han, and both the Seoul branch and the Hong Kong branch knew of this
relationship. Since the instant letters of credit, subject to this case, were
not stand-by letters of credit, which can be issued for the finance of a
money market, but were documentary credits, which require the existence
of goods, the Hong Kong branch, which loaned funds to Newroots - a
transit trader - for Newroots back-to-back letters of credit and then
acquired the shipping documents ofthe master letters ofcredit as collateral,
should have decided whether to negotiate the documents without delay
within the usual timeframe appropriate for the exchange of documents of
each back-to-back letter of credit and the examination of papers. (U.C.P.
500 Article 14(d)(i) stipulates the duration for the document examination
to be by the close of the seventh banking day following the date of its
receipt.) In the case of a negotiation, it is in accordance with the customary
practices of banks and trades, for the negotiating bank to send the
negotiating documents to the issuing bank and collect the loaned money
from the sum of the redemption from the issuing bank.
Nevertheless, as acknowledged in the original decision, in another
situation, the Hong Kong branch did not negotiate or collect fourteen
master letters of credit (worth US$15,420,000), including the five master
letters of credits in this case, for three to five months, which was beyond
the time period necessary for the exchange and inspection of documents,
but kept the documents. However, the Hong Kong branch did receive cash
reimbursement of a loan from the financially fragile Newroots for six other
letters of credit, 2" worth US$6,910,000. It voided those letters of credit
and sent back the documents.
In particular, in the case of the two master letters of credit2 65 issued by
the Jeil bank and the Seoul bank: the Hong Kong branch completed the
negotiations and requested reimbursement from the tow banks, and among
them, especially the Hong Kong branch received reimbursement from the
Jeil bank for the negotiation and completed the transactions of the letter of

264. These letters of credit were not the subject of this instant case.
265. These were also not the subject of this instant case.
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credit. When the Hong Kong branch, however, confirmed the forgery of
the airfreight shipping documents, it canceled the negotiation of those
letters of credit and refunded the redemption money to the Jeil bank upon
request of Shin Han and Newroots, who were afraid that the forgery might
be revealed.
After this action was taken, the Hong Kong branch stopped
submitting the documents and voided those master letters of credit,
recalling the documents it had already sent. The Hong Kong branch
ignored the request of Coworld, 2 which insisted that after negotiating the
documents for the letters of credit to which Coworld was the beneficiary,
the documents should be used for the reimbursement of the loan. The
Hong Kong branch then postponed the due date of reimbursement of the
loan, along with the reimbursement requests of Newroots and Shin Han,
and did not negotiate the shipping documents after having received
repayment of the loan in Hong Kong. [2850]
On these facts, the Hong Kong branch has performed abnormal,
irregular transactions that cannot be found in normal documentary credit
transactions that are based on cargo shipping. The December audit
conducted by its main office staff, pointed out that the Hong Kong branch
had received the payments in Hong Kong without having negotiated the
shipping documents, and thus, the Hong Kong branch knew that its
transactions with Newroots were irregular in light of the fact that it had
processed negotiation of the shipping documents for two letters of credit,267
mentioned above, on January 27.
According to the facts and records acknowledged in the original
decision, on previous occasions, the Hong Kong branch, with the burdens
of risk and responsibilities on itself, has dealt irregularly with letter-ofcredit transactions. At 10:00 a.m. on January 9, 1992, through the Seoul
Branch, it received notification of the forgery of airfreight shipping
documents for each letter of credit subject to this case and stop-payment
requests from the defendant bank, which confirmed the forgery of the
airfreight shipping documents. The forged documents pertained to the
same parties as transactions discussed above. Separate from this, it is
known that the Hong Kong branch also received forgery notification of
airfreight shipping documents of Shin Han related to another letter of credit
from the Korea Commercial Bank at around 10:40 a.m. on the same day.

266. Coworld was an assignee of two letters of credit (which were not the subject of this
instant case) from Newroots and became a beneficiary of those letters of credit. The facts
surrounding Coworld appeared in the decision of the high court.
267. These letters of credit were not the subject of this instant case.
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According to the court entry "Evidence No. 9 for Defendant" (copy
of factual written statement) quoted in the original decision, the head
officer of the Hong Kong branch, Richard Ting, had a conversation with
Sae-Chul Kim of the Seoul branch on January 8 or 9. (It appeared that the
conversation took place before the Seoul branch had received the forgery
notice from the defendant's bank, the Hanil Bank). During the telephone
conversation, Richard Ting asked Sae-Chul Kim what happened, saying
that there was talk of the forgery of shipping documents of the bankrupt
Shin Han. Sae-Chul Kim replied that he was also looking into the matter.
It is known that this conversation took place.
The applicant, Shin Han, whose subsidiaries were the beneficiaries of
the master letters of credit and the back-to-back letters of credit, went into
bankruptcy due to insufficient funds. Hearing of the forgery of the Shin
Han shipping documents, the Hong Kong branch also was looking into the
genuineness of the facts it had received from the Seoul branch. In addition,
the Hong Kong branch received forgery notification from Korea's
significant financial bodies - banks that have much public confidence of yet other documents. The forgery concerned airfreight shipping
documents for letters of credit, pertaining to Shin Han's subsidiaries,
Newroots and Charles International, that had already been negotiated and
sent.
In view of these various forgery notifications, it was most likely that
the shipping documents for the remaining letters of credit also had been
forged. Normally, under such circumstances, the authorized bank for
negotiation would have reexamined the shipping documents thoroughly
and would have contacted the beneficiary or the issuing bank, or contacted
the shipping company to confirm the forgery. The negotiating bank would
have decided to go through with the negotiation only after taking these
actions. However, in this case, the Hong Kong branch, which did not take
any such action, was too eager to be reimbursement for its loan for the
documents of each letter of credit subject to this case and deposited the
entire amount of over US$5,450,000 into the bank account.
According to the court entry of "Evidence No. 9 for defendant" (copy
of factual written statement), the Seoul branch originally introduced Shin
Han to the Hong Kong branch and then initiated the transactions. When
the bankruptcy of Shin Han became certain, the Seoul branch requested
that the Hong Kong branch negotiate the documents under any letters of
credit that had not yet been processed. It seems that the Seoul branch and
the Hong Kong branch had kept in close contact regarding the letters of
credit subject to this case.
In view of these circumstances, when the Hong Kong branch made
payment by credit for the sum of the negotiated letters of credit to
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

51

Florida Journal of International
Law,
Vol. 12,77ONAL
Iss. 1 LAW
[1998], Art. 2
FLORIDA JOURNAL
OF INTERNA

[Vol. 12

Newroots' account on January 9, 1992, between 1:55 p.m. and 2:24 p.m.,
which was the time when the negotiation of documents was completed, the
Hong Kong branch knew or had a sufficient reason to suspect that the
letters of credit transactions were being used for Shin Han's fraudulent
purposes only and that the related airfreight shipping documents were
forged. The Seoul branch also knew or had a sufficient reason to believe
that the forgery of the documents had occurred before the reimbursement
for the negotiation.
Looking at these circumstances as stated, in view of the principles of
law, the Seoul branch should not have reimbursed the sum prescribed in the
letters of credit to the Hong Kong branch. In addition, the Hong Kong
branch did not have the right to claim the redemption of the negotiation
sum from the Seoul branch. Thus, even if the Seoul branch has already
paid the sum for the letters of credit to the Hong Kong branch, it cannot
request the payment from the defendant for the sum described in the letters
of credit.
[2851] D. However, the original decision stated that when the Hong
Kong branch decided to negotiate these letters of credit on the 8th of
January 1992, which was the time the Hong Kong branch sent the message
for reimbursement to the Seoul branch, the negotiation of these letters of
credit had already occurred. Although the original court recognized that
the Hong Kong branch received the forgery notification at 10:00 a.m. on
January 9, it did not decide whether the Hong Kong branch knew or had a
sufficient reason to know the facts of the forgery.
Then the court ruled that it was difficult to find that the deposit into
Newroots account for the negotiation, without voiding it as fraud, was
either a breach of the principle of faithfulness, or an abuse of legal rights.
Also, the original decision ruled that it was difficult to view the action of
the Seoul branch, that is, the repayment of the sum for the negotiation to
the Hong Kong branch, which had a right of claim for the repayment, as a
breach of the principle of faithfulness, or an abuse of legal rights.
Therefore, the original judgment misinterpreted the legal principles
of the fraudulent letter-of-credit transactions, and misunderstood the legal
principles relating to the fundamental rule of faithfulness, and had factual
misconceptions about the case. These errors might have influenced their
decision making.
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3. Therefore, this Court, concurring with the opinions of three other
Justices, reverses the original decision and remands the case back to the
court of the original ruling, omitting decisions on the remaining grounds
on the final appeal.
August 29, 1997
Supreme Court Justices: Hyung-Sun Kim, Man-Ho Park;
Jun-Suh Park and Yong-Hoon Lee.
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VIII. APPENDIX 2

Shin Han (applicant,
buyer)

Hanil Bank (defendant,
guarantor)

r

Paris Bank Seoul (plaintiff,
issuing bank)

.

Newroots in Hong Kong
(beneficiary, sell & buyer,
applicant of back-to-back
letter of credit)

Paris Bank Hong Kong
(negotiating bank, issuer
of back-to-back ltr. of
credit)

. Charles Int'l in N.Y.
(seller, beneficiary of
back-to-back ltr. of credit)

French American Banking
(negotiating bank of
back-to-back ltr. of credit)
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